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Two Western Mediterranean/North African issues which receive a great
deal of attention are the Gibraltar question between Spain and Britain,
and the Western Sahara question between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Demo-
cratic Republic (SADR) . With a significant change in either one of these
issues, a more obscure regional issue is likely to surface and gain more
publicity—the status of Spain's enclaves in North Africa. A settlement
in the Sahara would allow Morocco to redirect its efforts to the Strait
of Gibraltar area. Furthermore, King Hassan II of Morocco has said that
a change in the status of Gibraltar will presage a change in the status
of the Spanish enclaves. Spain's military historically has had a large
stake in the enclaves, however, Spain's Socialists vowed even before the
1982 elections to keep the enclaves Spanish.
What is the nature of these Spanish enclaves today? Why do they
continue to exist? What is their historical origin? What is the status
of relations between Spain and Morocco? What are the superpower stakes
in the region? How does one systematically look at enclave situations
and similar territorial disputes in the 1980s, and in the recent past?
Answers to these questions represent the focus of this study.
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I. BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ENCLAVES
A. SETTING
During the past twelve centuries, Spain and North Africa periodically
have shifted political boundaries, and such shifting has resulted today
in a bizarre intermingling of North and South. The Strait of Gibraltar,
which is less than eight nautical miles at its narrowest point, divides
not only two continents, but also two vastly different cultures: the
Western European culture of Spain, and the Eastern culture of Arab-
African Morocco. In addition to their cultural differences, Spain and
Morocco are different in terms of their economic and industrial develop-
ment as well: Spain is a part of the bloc of developed, industrialized
nations of the North; Morocco is one of the developing, Third World
nations of the South.
Political domination, however, has transcended geographical bound-
aries. Between the years 1497 and 1848, Spain acquired two enclave
cities and three garrison enclaves on the coast of North Africa. The
combined area of these Spanish enclaves is 14 square miles. According
to the Spaniards, this area, with over 100,000 Spanish citizens, repre-
sents a part of metropolitan Spain. Ceuta, the largest, most important,
and closest enclave city to the Spanish mainland, has not been Moroccan
for 567 years, while Mel ilia, the other enclave city, has been Spanish
since 1497, 485 years.
The "enclaving" country, Morocco, has been concerned in varying
degrees with making these cities and minor enclaves on its northern
Riff Coast a part of Morocco. The differences between Spain and
15

Morocco's industrial, economic, and educational development continues
to promote in Spain a syndrome referred to as the "Threat from the
South". Without doubt, roots of the syndrome date back to seven centuries
that the Moslems inhabited Iberia. Additionally, however, the fact
remains that Spain fought in neither World War I nor World War II,
and that the 20th century Spanish military heroes are almost entirely
from the Riff Wars with the Arabs and Berbers of North Africa. Mili-
tarily speaking, the "Threat from the South" is a very real image
based on historical recollection of the recent past.
Peaceful coexistence has been the norm in the enclaves since the
end of the Riff Wars in 1926. There have been exceptions to peace,
and as recently as 1975 the Spanish enclaves in North Africa caused
significant tension between Spain and Morocco as a sidelight to the
major issue of confrontation in the Spanish Sahara. Three letters from
Morocco and two from Spain were sent to the United Nations, specifi-
cally addressing the issue of the enclaves. Spain declared that the
Moroccan position was a threat to Spanish "territorial integrity",
and a ten-ship flotilla was dispatched to "show the flag" in Ceuta and
the other major enclave, the city of Mel ill a, 120 nautical miles east-
southeast of Ceuta [Ref. 1].
Tensions continued as four terrorist-style bombings occurred in
the enclaves, some of which resulted in deaths and injuries. A number
of Moroccans were expelled from Ceuta. In July 1975, Spanish tanks and
troops faced Moroccan troops at the Mel IT! a border. The incident started
over the demolition of a structure that impeded construction of a
frontier fence. At the U.N., accusations were made of Spanish persecution
16

of Moroccans in Ceuta. Later in the year, with the resolution of the
Saharan question in November 1975, King Hassan II declared that the
return of Ceuta and Mel ilia would not become a major issue until Gib-
raltar was returned to Spain. He did not feel it was wise for one
country "... to dominate both sides of the entry to the Mediterranean",
[Ref. 2],
According to Morocco: A Country Study , in 1977 Moroccan Foreign
Minister Boucetta, "... leader of the irrendentist-oriented Istiqlal,
emphasized Morocco's patience and flexibility on the enclave issue",
[Ref. 3]. In 1979, bomb incidents occurred in both Ceuta and Mel ilia
with Moroccan patriotic organizations assuming credit. At a 1981 news
conference, King Hassan II said that Morocco must once and for all say
that Ceuta and Mel ilia are Moroccan as they always have been.
B. THE EVENTS OF THE EARLY 1980s
Whether or not Hassan's statements regarding the linkage between
Gibraltar and the Spanish enclaves are rhetorical, the first major
changes in the area in over a decade began to occur in early 1982. A
scenario for potential conflict of interest began to unfold which could
have involved two U.S. friends: Spain, a NATO ally; and Morocco, a
close friend of the U.S. The series of events were as follows:
1. In 1980-81, Britain for the first time officially presented to
the members of Parliament the Spanish point of view regarding Gibraltar.
Up until that time, only the British and Gibraltarian positions had
been "fairly" represented, according to the Spaniards. Spain's appli-
cation for NATO entry was sent to Brussels during late 1981, and was
linked to the activity as well. [Ref . 4]
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2. Spain considered the Parliamentary presentation to be a positive
development which grew out of British-Spanish negotiations that were
being conducted in Lisbon regarding the Gibraltar question. For its
part, Spain announced in January 1982 that it would end the land block-
ade of the border between Gibraltar and Spain on 20 April 1982. Spain
had closed the border nearly 13 years earlier, in 1969. New optimism
and speculation grew in Spain about the return of Gibraltar.
3. King Hassan reiterated at a news conference that if Gibraltar
was returned to Spain, he would demand that Spain relinquish to Morocco
its Places of Sovereignty in North Africa. The linkage to Gibraltar
is a convenient one, as Ceuta is situated across the Strait in near
mirror-image to Gibraltar, [Ref. 5]
C. CONTRIBUTORY CIRCUMSTANCES
In early 1982, other circumstances which exacerbated the Strait
situation were:
1. Increased arms sales to Morocco from the U.S., paid for in
large part by Saudi Arabia;
2. Continuing stalemate in the six-year old war with the Polisario
in Western Sahara;*
^Morocco has been fighting a war against guerilla forces in the
western Sahara since 1976. At that time, Morocco annexed the major part
of the former Spanish colony of Spanish Sahara. The Polisario (Popular
Front for the Liberation of Saguia al Hamra and Rio de Oro) guerillas
are backed by Colonel Qaddafi of Libya and by Algeria. The shadow
government of the Polisario is the SADR (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic),
A dispute over the seating of the SADR at the OAU (Organization of African
Unity) has threatened the organization's unity. [Ref. 6],
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3. Increasingly disenchanted Moroccan populace who had seen a war
which began with popular support turn sour in stalemate as 40 percent
of the national budget was apportioned for defense [Ref. 7];
4. Increasing military buildup in Morocco where the armed forces
have grown from 60,000 in 1975 to more than 120,000 in 1982, and
contimes to grow;
5. Failed crops in Morocco for three consecutive years;
6. In Spain, a government and country that was in the process of
watching the trials of the conspirators in the military coup attempt
that occurred less than one year prior, in February 1981;
7. Increasing popularity of the Spanish Socialist Party;
8. On the other side of the Spanish political spectrum, the exis-
tence of a group of politically minded right-wing military officers in
the Spanish Army who retained a large political input;
9. The fact that the politically powerful generals and colonels of
the Army had spent much of their early careers in the Protectorate of
Spanish Morocco, or in the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, grappling
with the problem of their defense—the only traditional major external
defense problem that Spain has faced in the 20th century, namely, the
"Threat from the South".
The above circumstances hypothetical ly could have caused the follow-
ing chain of events to occur:
1. Britain's return of Gibraltar to Spain after Spain's entry into
NATO;
2. Return of Ceuta and Me 1 i 11 a under the U.N. resolution on Decol-
onization in response to King Hassan II * s demands [Ref. 8.].
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3. The vow of Spanish Socialists and senior military to keep the
North African enclaves Spanish. Although they are unlikely political
partners, they are vocally united by nationalism and the issue of the
territorial sovereignty of the enclaves.
4. The potential of the return of the enclaves as a unifying issue
in Morocco, in the face of internal problems, causes the King to press
the irredentist claims which have proven to be an effective tool to
promote national unity in Morocco's recent past;
5. Heightening of tensions occurs ranging from diplomatic debate,
to border incidents, to civilian marches on the enclaves (similar to
the Green March on Sahara in 1975), to blockade (similar to that imposed
by Spain on Gibraltar), or to a brushfire war (similar to the Falklands
War). The location would be at the busy Strait of Gibraltar rather than
the isolated South Atlantic.
Although the likelihood of the above hypothetical situation seems
remote, it is similar in many of the latter aspects to events which
occurred in the region in 1975, and since. The cooling of the 1975
enclaves tensions came only after Spain conceded the Sahara.
D. 1975 AND 1982-83: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
How are the Strait situations of today and of 1975 similar; how
are they different? Spain still supports the status quo. The King of
Morocco brings up the issue to exert pressure on Spain on this or any
other issue where he deems it useful. In 1975, Moroccan leaders took
advantage of the political climate in Spain where terminally ill Franco
put Spain in a leadership succession situation it had not seen in 40 years
20

The political situation in Spain in 1982 is not that critical. How-
ever, in light of the 1981 coup attempt and continuing rumors of
military conspiracy and arrests, moving up the national election to
Fall 1982 (required by the crumbling of the ruling center coalition
majority) and the rise of the Socialist Party in Spain, the 1982-83
period can be looked upon as a significant crossroads as Spain strives
to complete its first decade as a democracy.
A misreading by King Hassan and the Government of Morocco of the
political climate north of the Strait could be a serious blow to Spain's
democratic growth. Any lack of resolve displayed by Spain regarding
the position on the enclaves could be interpreted as a sign of weak-
ness, which might invite the historically irredentist Moroccans to act.
The fact that Spain's accession to NATO did not include the North
African enclaves under the NATO umbrella is not looked upon favorably
either by the Spanish Socialists, or by the Spanish military which is
charged with their defense. The NATO exclusion sends a signal to the
Soviets in regard to a lack of understanding of Spanish sensitivities
about the enclaves within NATO. The exclusion is another area for the
Soviets to exploit to undermine Alliance cohesion.
Differences which exist between 1975 and 1982-83 are many:
1. The strong personal friendship between King Hassan II and King
Juan Carlos has helped considerably to resolve some of the differences
between the two countries, and to build up areas of cooperation;
2. The growth of the Moroccan military is a major difference. The
size of the armed forces has doubled, and continues to grow; this could
contribute to future tensions;
21

3. The special relationship between Morocco and the United States
has become closer.
4. The King and his government have continued to portray Morocco
as a moderate Arab country that can act as an aribitor in many disputes.
The Fez Conference in September 1982 was a Moroccan move toward con-
tinued leadership of Arab solidarity. In that case, a PLO homeland was
the issue. It also was Morocco and King Hassan that helped to set up
early meetings to arrange for Sadat's trip to Israel in 1977.
5. On the other hand, the 1975 situation came shortly after two
assassination attempts on King Hassan by the military. It also
occurred shortly after the Moroccans sent 3,000 troops, via Soviet
ships, to reinforce Syria in the October 1973 War. Morocco has indeed
become more moderate, and the King has solidified his position internally.
Differences within Spain between 1982-83 and 1975 include its
transition to democracy, its NATO membership, and its continued attempts
to depoliticize the military, especially the Army. A major difference
in Spain from the 1975 period is the rise of the Socialists.
Morocco may perceive the Spanish military as ineffective, immo-
bile, and disunited. A Spanish military, in disarray over its reorgan-
ization for NATO, and plagued with continued disclosures and arrests
of officers involved in coup plots would offer less resistance to
Moroccan advances. In The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean
,
Jesse Lewis, Jr. has stated that while King Hassan is in power, such
a move seems unlikely. But he says, "... another Moroccan Govern-
ment might take a radically different attitude, particularly a regime
headed by persons of the same orientation as the young officers who
ousted King Idris of Libya in 1969". [Ref. 9],
22

E. THE IMPACT OF THE FALKLANDS ON THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR
The Falkland's crisis, and the actions of the British, have done a
number of things to affect the Gibraltar Strait situation. The inva-
sion of the Falklands by Argentina in early April 1982 occurred just
weeks before the Gibraltar frontier was to open. During the weeks that
followed, two U.S. allies—Argentina, a U.S. Latin American ally who
had taken on a special relationship with the U.S. regarding El Salvador,
and Great Britain, a U.S. NATO ally—became embroiled in a territorial
dispute in the South Atlantic.
Spain postponed the opening of the Gibraltar frontier from 20 April
1982 until 20 June 1982 in hopes that the crisis would be settled. Spain
wanted Britain's full attention for the Gibraltar negotiations after
the scheduled border opening. The opening would have been the first
major concession in over 13 years. The opening did not occur. It then
was postponed indefinitely when the Falkland's crisis continued.* The
month of June 1982 corresponded with the final British push into Stanley,
rather than an historic reopening of the Gibraltar border by Spain.
At the present time, Spain generally supports the status quo regard-
ing its possession of the enclaves, although there have been some
Spanish concessions such as the Moroccan use of Mel ill a. On the other
hand, Morocco desires the return of the enclaves under the U.N. resolu-
tion regarding decolonization. King Hassan does not hesitate to raise
the issue when it suits him to gain leverage on Spain, or any of a
number of other issues. He also must bring up the enclave issue
periodically to satisfy the irredentist elements in Morocco.
*The Gibraltar frontier opened to limited traffic on 15 December 1982.
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Regional stability in the Western Mediterranean, and specifically
good relations between Spain and Morocco, are of great interest to all
who use the Strait. Passage of shipping through the Strait is signi-
ficant for all Mediterranean littoral countries. Estimates of the
number of commercial ships that pass Gibraltar each year range widely
from 51,000 to 87,000.
The French and Soviets depend largely upon the Strait to link
their Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets. The U.S. Sixth Fleet uses
the Strait for entry and exit of its ships and submarines in transit
to and from the U.S. East Coast.
The location of the enclaves (at and near the strategically
important Strait of Gibraltar) can be considered in Clausewitzian
terms as being at a "decisive point". The enclaves would be a source
of potential conflict between Spain and Morocco should appropriate
conditions develop in the area. The enclaves represent a constant


























































The five Spanish enclaves in North Africa officially are called
"The Places of Sovereignty in North Africa" ( Las Plazas de Soberani a
del Norte de Africa ). Occasionally they are referred to as "presidios",
meaning garrison, fortress, or prison. Only three of the five truly
fit that description, which really is a term from the past. Today the
three minor enclaves ( plazas menores ) truly are just that, i.e., mili-
tary garrisons and nothing more. The major enclaves, Ceuta and Mel ilia,
are fairly significant metropolitan port cities with about 60,000 people
in each. In addition to the large civilian populace in both Ceuta and
Mel ilia, there are large garrisons of soldiers.
All the enclaves are situated between 35 and 36 degrees north lati-
tude. This places them roughly on the same latitude as Cape Hatteras,
Mempnis, Albuquerque, and San Luis Obispo in the United States; and Malta,
Crete, Cyprus, Tehran, Kabul, Pusan and Tokyo in Europe and Asia. All
of the enclaves are located on the Mediterranean side of the Strait of
Gibraltar, and are within the area known as the Alboran 3asin.
The five enclaves consist of two large cities, one island, one former
island now connected to mainland Africa by a low sand beach, and one
small island group. Ceuta and Melilla are the cities; Penon de Velez
de la Gomera is the former island which by accretion has been connected
to mainland Africa. Alhucemas is the single island which is located
in a bay which has the same name (Bay of Alnucemas, also called Bay of
Ajdir by the Moroccans). There is a Moroccan city called Al Hoceima
26

(population 25„000) which is located on the western side of the bay.
Finally, an island group called the Chafarinas Islands consists of three
small islands.
The city of Ceuta (population 64,567) is directly across the Strait
of Gibraltar, twelve nautical miles south of the Rock. Mount Hacho, a
636 foot high mountain on the eastern extreme end of the cape, one mile
east of center-city Ceuta, and Gibraltar (elevation 1398 feet), consti-
tute the "Pillars of Hercules" of antiquity.
Sixty-five nautical miles by sea on the Moroccan coast from the Strait
and Ceuta lies the small island of Penon de Velez de la Gomera, now a
cape due to its sand isthmus connection.* A castle fortress dominates
the island. There are some minor structures that once comprised a small
village. The island is solely a garrison today; all the inhabitants
are military members except for a few civilians. Some work for the mili-
tary at such jobs as boat mechanics; others are dependents of the commis-
sioned and noncommissioned officers serving there.**
*Early maps, dating back to the German editions of tne Ortelius Atlas
from 1572 to 1602, clearly show the Penon de Velez as a large rock island
separated from the coast. A civilian boat mechanic who had worked for
the Spanish Navy for over 20 years told me that the beach area had devel-
oped naturally by the action of the tides. One source says tnat the sand
which has built up is the result of ". . . the debris that fell into the
sea from the construction of a coastal road (which has) accumulated in
a bulge that now connects the Penon to the continent." Rezette, p. 67.
**While at anchor off Velez aboard the Ceuta-based ferry that serves
the enclaves, I observed two children, a boy and a girl, aboard the
small resupply boat. I believe they were the children of the lieutenant
that was head of the Navy detachment on Velez. Additionally, two women,
both in their late teens or early twenties, came off the island onto the
ferry for transport to Ceuta. One was the wife of a young Spanish Ser-
geant who had just finished duty on Velez; the other probably was her
sister. A young sailor, a native of the Canaries, had just finished
duty on Velez. He said that often there were families there either to
27

Continuing east 30 nautical miles by sea, Alhucemas Island (also
called Isla Alhucemas or Penon de Alhucemas) lies less than one mile
off shore in the Bay of Alhucemas, which is also called the Bay of
Ajdir. By sea, 60 nautical miles east of Alhucemas on the eastern
side of a large cape called Cabo de Tres Forcas (Three Forks Cape),
which juts 15 miles out from the coast, is the city of Me 1 i 11 a (popu-
lation 53,591).
Twenty-five nautical miles east of Mel ilia are the Chafarinas
Islands (also spelled Zafarine and Chaffarinas). This is a group of
three small islands about two miles offshore and 12 nautical miles
east of Morocco's border with Algeria. Congresso, the westernmost
island, is the largest, covering about 1/5 of a square mile (128 acres).
It is about 230 feet high, based on the contour lines on the large
scale map which appears in the Rezette book [Ref. 10]. It is uninhab-
ited except for lookout posts [Ref. 11]. The center island, Isabel II,
is just over one mile around. The garrison is likely quartered
where there used to be a village with a population of about 500. The
easternmost and smallest island is El Rey, used in the past as a ceme-
tary by the residents of Isabel! II [Ref. 12].
visit or to stay for the length of the individual officer's or noncom-
missioned officer's tour of duty. The availability of accomodations
for such families is not known. Possibly they stay in the structures
that once made up the village. One fishing boat of unknown nationality
was anchored close to the sand isthmus, possibly indicating the presence
of permanent fishermen in residence there or on the coast in Morocco.
The presence of Spanish civilians and families on the island would add
a different dimension to the garrison enclaves if ever there were
heightened tensions in the area. The Spaniards must feel fairly secure
on the outposts to bring the civilian families there.
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Because of the ruggedness of the coast, the easiest way to connect
one end of the Riff Coast with the other is by sea. The port of Ceuta
on the eastern extreme connects easily with the port of Mel ilia on the
western extreme. A ferry goes between the enclaves weekly making one
eastern run from Ceuta to Mel ilia (Monday/Tuesday) and one western
return (Thursday/Fri day )
.
Land connection of the rugged Riff Coast is by Morocco's route P-39.
The road runs from Ceuta via Tetouan and Chechaouen to Al Hoceima—
a
distance of 190 miles. Much of it is winding mountain road, so a trip
by car takes about nine hours. From Al Hoceima, Morocco's P-39 route
runs east via Nador to Melilla, a distance of 114 miles. By car, the
connection takes about three hours.
Currently, although Morocco P-39 is considered a "good" road by
Fodor's North Africa [Ref. 13], there are no legal provisions for getting
from the Moroccan coast to the Spanish garrisons at Velez, Alhucemas,
or Chafarinas. The only connection for these minor enclaves is by the
Ceuta-Melilla ferry. Disembarking at these garrisons is by official
permission only, since they are military outposts.
By air, the Riff Coast of Morocco is connected with the rest of
Morocco by the 7,000 foot runway at Al Hoceima. Flights connect to
Casablanca, Tetouan, and Rabat.* During the summer tourist season
*A1 Hoceima/Cote du Rif airport is a Moroccan civil aerodrome. Its
elevation is 89 feet and it has 7,100 feet of hard surfaced runway, ito
runway lights are indicated. It is equipped with a VHF omnidirectional
range (VOR) system and a low frequency nondirectional radio beacon,
according to the POD Enroute Supplement for Europe, North Africa, and
Mideast [Ref. 14]"! Fodor's North Africa indicates that in season there
are weekly flights by Air France from Paris to Al Hoceima [Ref. 15].
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there are two flights per week that connect Al Hoceima's Cote du Rif
airport with Tetuoan, 75 nautical miles west. During the winter there
is a single flight weekly connecting Al Hoceima with Tetuoan. Tetuoan
is 24 miles south of Ceuta. Mel ilia has a 3,000 foot runway. Normal
service for Melilla airport is approximately five flights daily to
Malaga. Nador, south of Melilla is shown on charts of the 1960's to
have an airport, however, its small runway is now inactive. Some older
charts also show a seaplane base located in the small bay between
Melilla and Nador. Ceuta has no air facilities presently, although a
military heliport is planned, with possible expansion for civilian use
[Ref. 16]. Tangier has a 9,000 foot runway and connecting flights to
Casablanca, Madrid, Malaga, and Paris.
The Riff Coast is oriented topographically in near mirror-image to
to the Spanish Costa del Sol. As one looks at the two coasts and the
areas inland, for approximately 50 nautical miles the similarity of the
terrain and physical features is apparent. First, there are the simi-
larities of the major rock capes with fortresses at Gibraltar and Mount
Hacho. Moving east along the coast from the Strait, the shorelines
open north and south almost symmetrically to form the Alboran Sea.
From the Strait inland to the northeast there are the Sierra 3ermeja
and Sierra de Yequas mountain ranges which join the even higher peaks
of the Sierra Nevada mountains that continue to run in an easterly direc-
tion. In similar fashion on the Moroccan side, the rugged Riff mountain
range starts at the Strait and goes southeast and then east.
Inland, 100 miles north from the Costa del Sol, a major river, the
Guadalquivir, has its headwaters and flows between the Sierra Morena
mountains on the north and a smaller range of mountains on the soutn.
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The river flows into a wide, fertile valley, and into the Atlantic
north of Cadiz. The smaller Guadalete River flows from the foothills
into the Atlantic abeam Cadiz.
In similar fashion in Morocco, the small Loukkos River flows from
the Riff foothills into the Atlantic near Larache. The larger Sebou
River flows from its headwaters some 100 nm inland from the Riff Coast
between the Riff Mountains and the Mid Atlas range. It then flows
through a wide, fertile valley into the Atlantic near Kenitra, 20 miles
north of Rabat-Sale.
This combination of general topographic similarity is striking:
similar Strait frontage, coastline progressions eastward, mountain
ranges and their orientations, the major rivers and river valleys.
Just as there are major similarities, however, there also are major
differences. When one looks in a mirror, the image looks almost iden-
tical. But closer observation reveals certain things that are not quite
the same. For example, as one touches one's right ear, the image in
the mirror is touching its left.* The two coasts have subtle differences
such as those associated with mirror images. The Riff Coast, for exam-
ple, is extremely rugged from southeast of Tetouan all the way to Alhu-
cemas Bay. The valley area surrounding the bay, immediately returns
to rugged coast after Cape Tres Forcas in the Mel ilia and Nador areas.
This ruggedness has made a coastal highway system nearly impossible
(See Photo 1.) In Spain, however, the Costa del Sol, although rugged
in spots, is endowed with at least a narrow strip of almost uninterrupted
Discussion of the similarities and differences of mirror images is
based on material included in lectures by Professor F. H. S. Stolfi at
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1981.
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flat shoreline stretching from north of Gibraltar to west of Malaga.
Even then a winding coastal road continues from Malaga to Nerja, Motril,
and Almeria, connecting the various stretches of beach.
The Riff Coast of northern Morocco also is apparently more prone
to fog than the Costa del Sol of southern Spain. A satellite photograph
of the entire Gibraltar Strait/Alboran Basin/Atlantic Coast area showed
at one point a fog-shrouded Riff Coast from Ceuta to Cape Tres Forcas.
The fog began at the Riff Mountains and moved out in a band some 30 miles
wide. In the same photo, the Costa del Sol, the Strait and the Atlantic
coasts of Spain and Morocco were completely clear. While this may have
been an isolated observation, the likelihood of fog as a problem was
corroborated by discussions with a young Spanish sailor who had just
completed a six month tour of duty on Velez from March to September
1982.* He said that often it was so clear that he could see the Sierra
Nevadas of southern Spain 120 nautical miles away. I personally was
able to observe this periodic excellent visibility. But, he added,
at times for three days a week the fog was so thick he could hardly see
his hand at arms length. Fog as a problem is documented in Alhucemas
as well [Ref. 17].
Therefore, with all their general natural similarities, the Riff Coast
differs from the Costa del Sol in two major ways--extremely rugged coast-
line and coastal terrain with no long stretches of beach, and a tendency
toward heavy fog. Both of these factors would inhibit resort growth
*The reason for the long tour of duty on Velez was because he con-
tinued to volunteer to stay on at the garrison. He said it was like a










































and development potential of the type that has occurred on the Costa
del Sol.
The enclaves are dispersed over 150 nautical miles from the Strait
to just west of the Algerian border. A similar comparative air dis-
tance in the United States is from Baltimore to New York City, Chicago
to Springfield, or San Francisco to Morro Bay. At the closest point,
Ceuta is only 10 nautical miles from mainland Spain. Ten nautical
miles is about the distance across San Francisco Bay from Berkeley to
the Golden Gate Bridge, or the distance from Rapid City to Mount Rush-
more, or across the opening of Chesapeake Bay from Cape Henry to the
Delmarva Peninsula. The Chafarinas Islands are the farthest enclave
from the Spanish mainland at a distance of 90 nautical miles. A com-
parative distance is from San Francisco to Point Sur, Los Angeles to
San Diego, or Baltimore to Philadelphia.
The total area of the enclaves is 14 square miles. By comparison,
Gibraltar is only 2.4 square miles. Ceuta is about nine square miles.
Mel ilia is four square miles. The others are less than one square
mile total.
Climatically, Ceuta and the rest of the enclaves are Mediterranean
subtropical, characterized by a mild climate with summer drought and
winter rain [Ref. 18], Rainfall figures for Ceuta and Melilla are not
available, however, Gibraltar averages 35.5 inches per year. The
figures for Gibraltar and Ceuta probably are similar due to their
close proximity. Rainfall at Gibraltar is nearly twice that of other
coastal cities within 50 nm of the Strait. Cadiz on the Atlantic
averages 18.5 inches, and Malaga averages 19 inches [Ref. 19]. This
phenomena is "
. . . due mainly to the easy passage through the straits
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of depression, which gives rise to heavy winter rain, although there
are three months of drought in the summer." [Ref. 20]. As the weather
systems pass from east to west, they are likely funnelled by the high
mountains in Spain and Morocco through the Strait.
B. CEUTA
1 . Geography and Natural Resources
If one thinks of Gibraltar as having a north/south orientation,
then the cape which Ceuta occupies is oriented east/west. There are at
least three fairly distinct areas in Ceuta. Mount Hacho is the farthest
east with a lighthouse and an old fortress surrounded by a wall. It is
almost entirely for military use, although public roads do go through
and around the military areas. Mount Hacho has been heavily tunneled
according to a taxi driver. (Similar tunnels have been dug in Gibraltar
for underground facilities, such as a hospital, ammunition storage,
and an elaborate cistern.)
The commercial city of Ceuta and its port facility are located
on the narrow isthmus which attaches Mount Hacho to mainland Africa.
Apartment buildings, shops, hotels, and parks are located here. The
appearance of the city is that of any Andalusian city of comparable
size. The port is on the north side of the isthmus facing the Strait
of Gibraltar. The Rock of Gibraltar, and the mountains north of Tarifa
and Algeciras, Spain, are almost always visible from Ceuta.* The
*It is my observation that this near constant visual contact with
peninsular Spain, coupled with its location on a point of land with a
wide frontier gives Ceuta a feeling of security that one does not neces-
sarily sense in Melilla. On the other extreme, Melilla has virtually
no view of even the mountains of peninsular Spain, and is half-surroundea
by Morocco with towering Mt. Gurugu in the distance. From this mountain,
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Map 6. Strait of Gibraltar Between Gibraltar and Ceuta (Detail).















































third area is a frontier. The isthmus on which the city is located
has little in the way of natural fortification against land attack,
therefore, at various times during the 1900' s, a buffer has been
extended outward to make it more secure. Between the main city of
Ceuta and this frontier buffer is the Arab Quarter, the older section
of town. The Moslems of Ceuta live in this small "barrio" (native
section) which has its own mosque [Ref. 21].
Ceuta has no natural resources and too little land for much
cultivation. However, an economic guide [Ref. 22] distributed by the
city of Ceuta indicates that although the agricultural resources of
Ceuta are limited, it does have some livestock: 5,000 pigs, 1,000
goats, 400 cows are raised in stables with some of the goats grazing
on Mount Hacho and the frontier area between the city and the Moroccan
border. Additionally, there are 1,750 acres of cultivated land of
which 335 acres are irrigated (less than 20 percent). Rezette indi-
cates that about 1960, intensive reforestation began in the frontier
area. Over the centuries, much of the forest had been cut down to
give a clear defensive observation area. In the mid-lSQO's, charcoal
makers from Malaga used much of what wood remained for making charcoal
With about 20 years of growth since the reforestation program started,
the forest is growing back, reducing the erosion problem that had
occasionally existed previously.
Water is a problem in Ceuta, as it is in Gibraltar. Recently,
however, "... the cabinet (of Spain) has decided to spend 350,000
pesetas (approximately $300,000) for improvement of the water supply
for Ceuta" [Ref. 23]. Ceuta officials indicate that they have two
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cisterns. A main reservoir located in the frontier area near the border
to the west was pointed out on a large map of Ceuta in the town hall.
The quality of the water appeared to be excellent; it had a good taste.
All pools were filled, and all fountains were in operation during the
daytime and early evening. By contrast, Melilla's water tasted slightly
salty and overtreated. The pool at the Mel ilia parador had no water
in it. The desk clerk explained that drought was the reason. None of
Melilla's many fountains and parks, in which the city takes such pride,
had water in them.
2. People
The population of Ceuta is 66,550 as of 1 December 1981.* Infor-
mation varies widely regarding the ethnic breakdown of the population.
Most sources say that from 80-100 percent of the population is Spanish.
Whenever the question was asked of Spanish officials of how many Moroc-
cans live in Ceuta or Melilla, the immediate response in both Ceuta and
Mel ilia was 12,000. For Ceuta this means that 18 percent of the popu-
lation is ethnically Moroccan.**
Other minorities in the area include 270 ethnic Indians. Many
of them are shop owners or businessmen. I came in contact with two such
individuals in the enclaves. The first was a businessman who lived in
the Canary Islands. I met him on the 18-hour ferry ride from Melilla
to Ceuta. He was one of about five civilians that took the ferry all
*This figure was quoted by the official chronicler of Ceuta in an
interview at Ceuta' s Town Hall.
**Ethnically Moroccan as it is used here, includes Arabs and Berbers.
This is to differentiate from those who are official Moroccan nationals
with passports or official papers identifying them as citizens of Morocco,
Further discussion of the official Spanish divisions is contained below.
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the way to Ceuta.* The Indian businessman had a British passport. He
spoke no English, only Spanish, a little French, and presumeably his
native tongue. He was not a resident of either Ceuta nor Melilla, but
rather of Las Pal mas in the Canary Islands. When I asked about his
business, he simply said he had lots of different commercial concerns.
He said he used to live in Tetouan, apparently when it was still a part
of the Spanish Protectorate. Although he now lived in the Canaries, he
said he liked Tetuoan. According to him, it was quiet, and did not
encourage tourists. Not like Tangier, he said.
The other Indian man with whom I spoke was a shop owner. His
shops sold cameras, radios, watches, and porcelain. He owned six such
shops. He said he spoke five languages. In our informal conversation
he said that he had left India at the age of three. He now had a Span-
ish passport. In talking about the Indian population, he said that
there were about 330 Indians, including families. Whatever the exact
number, the Indians comprise less than one percent of Ceuta' s population.
About 30-32 ethnic Indians owned between 45 and 50 small businesses,
probably the camera outlets like his.** Obviously, some of the Indians
own more than one shop, as he does. Their shop ownership seems slightly
disproportionate with their number as a percentage of the total population,
*The rest of the passengers on the ferry were soldiers and sailors,
and a few relatives. The crew of the ferry was civilian. The military
men were coming from, or going to, the minor enclaves of Velez and
Alhucemas. In Velez, the ferry picked up two young women. One was a
Sergeant's wife, and the other presumeably was her younger sister.




Other Indians had various passports: some Spanish, some Indian, some
British. He volunteered that he recommended to his sons that what-
ever country they decided to live in, they should become citizens of
that country as soon as possible. He considered assimilation into
the local culture to be very important. He felt that it made matters
much easier in all respects. Shop permits for those with foreign pass-
ports apparently were not as easily granted as they had been in the past.*
The Indian shop owner said that another influential minority of
similar size in Ceuta was the Jewish community. He thought there were
about 300 Jews in Ceuta.**
Significant numbers of Jews were expelled from Spain during the
Inquisition:
The dispersion following the Expulsion Edict was chaotic, fol-
lowing no set paths. Only one rule applied: the richer the Jew,
the more liberal he could be with his bribes and, therefore, the
Although there seems to be a lot of influence by the small Indian
population, this could be deceptive. The Spaniards control the grant-
ing of shop permits and Spanish passports. It is my impression that
these are not granted easily. Discussions with some U.S. State Depart-
ment officials assigned in Morocco and Spain indicated that Indian
commercial influence in the area— including Morocco, Ceuta, l-lelilla,
and the Canaries—was significant. This I can neither confirm nor
deny. I do, however, suspect that it is an area that the Spanish are
aware of, and are attempting to both control and use it to their best
advantage by selectively granting licenses and citizenship.
**The Random House Dictionary of the English Language
_
(Unabridged )
def i nes "Sephardim" as "Jews of Spain and Portugal or their descendants
,
distinguished from the Ashkenazim chiefly by their liturgy, religious
customs, and pronunciation of Hebrew". The origin of the term is from
the Hebrew "Sepharad", a region mentioned in the Bible in Obadian 20.
The Oxford Annotated Bible says that Sepharad was "wrongly thought to
be Spain". It probably was originally a region in Asia Minor. (Addi-
tional source consulted: Webster's New World Dictionary .)
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freer he was in his choice of destination. The poorest Jews fled
across the Gibraltar straits into the mountains of Morocco. [Ref. 25],
In the early 1900's, Spain's policies were made more advanta-
geous for the Sephardics:
The establishment of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco in 1912
ensured the immigration into Tetouan, Ceuta, and Larache of some
25,000 Jews, who became an important support group for Spain's pol-
icies in Africa. [Ref. 26].
The tie of Spanish nationalism to the Sephardic community is
illustrated by the fact that during the Holocaust, Franco made it known
that he would give protection to any of the Sephardics in Europe that
could make it to Spain.*
With the independence of Morocco and the end of the Spanish
Protectorate in 1956, a number of Sephardic Jews may have relocated in
Ceuta, Mel ilia, and the Spanish mainland. Furthermore, there was a
major reconciliation between Spain and the Jewish Community in the mid-
1970's. Both Morocco and Spain have made major efforts to attract
members of the Jewish community to return, who left those countries
for the state of Israel in the late 1940' s and early 1950' s.
The significance of the Jewish population in the region is not
really clear. Morocco set about on a campaign in the 1970' s to win
the return of many of the Jews that left Morocco for Israel. There
currently are about 30,000 Jews in Morocco, [Ref. 27]. Some are quite
influential. For example, the head of the government-run Moroccan
Phosphate Office, (Office Cherifien des Phosphates), in Paris is a
*This was Franco's official policy. According to the personal
accounts of Jews who escaped the Holocaust by going through France
and Spain to Portugal, their worst treatment during the journey was
by the local authorities in Spain.
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Moroccan of Jewish descent.*
During my visit to Ceuta, I spoke briefly with one of the
functionaries at the town hall. She was a Spaniard of Jewish descent.
She probably was in her early 30' s. As a child she had lived in
Mel ilia, was educated in Tangier schools where she learned to speak
beautiful English. She now works for the local government in Ceuta.
After we had concluded our discussion and she had left, the official
chronicler of Ceuta, a man probably in his late 50' s, said to me as
an aside that she was "Israeli". Although it was my impression that
everyone in the office had a great deal of respect for her talents
and abilities, including the chronicler who seemed quite proud of ner,
I thought it unusual that he made a special point to identify her as
a Spanish Jew.
The Moroccan population of Ceuta, and indeed of Mel ilia as
well, is one of the major areas of contention between Spain and
Morocco. It is one of the issues with which the local government
must concern itself directly. Specific issues affect the relations
between the Spaniards and the local ethnic Moroccans, and the Moroccan
nationals that are day workers and traders in Ceuta and Melilla. The
specific issues usually have to do with discrimination, control of the
number of legal and illegal Moroccans that work, live, or own property
in the enclaves, and smuggling.
*This was related to me by Mr. M. F. Stowasser, a phosphates expert
and physical scientist with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Section of Non-
metallic Minerals. Mr. Stowasser, who has worked often with the O.C.P.
officials, said that the office was run effectively and efficiently by




The 12,000 figure given by officials as the Moroccan popula-
tion of Ceuta is confusing and deceptive. This figure only includes
those that stay overnight in the city, i.e., those that live in the
main city of Ceuta or in the Arab Quarter. Thousands of Moroccans
from the surrounding countryside cross the border into Ceuta daily.
During three hours of observation of the frontier border crossing,
there seemed to be little if any concern on the part of either Moroccan
or Spanish customs police at the border for inspection of what was
carried into Ceuta, either by car or on one's person.* Many Moroccans
in western dress drove through, as did many tourists and Spaniards as
well. I was told that many Spaniards go into the Moroccan countryside
for food and produce because it is cheaper than in Ceuta, where it is
mostly brought over from the mainland by ferry or imported from Morocco,
There is a very limited cultivated, irrigated area in the frontier area,
At the border, many women in caftans went on foot, in and out
of Ceuta. Much of the traffic appeared to be for transporting small
amounts of produce into Ceuta to sell or trade for Spanish products
such as clothing or blankets which they took back to Morocco.
*Moroccan customs police did strip search a group of five young
European backpackers as they passed from Morocco into Ceuta. I was
told later by my Moroccan guide who was with me from Ceuta to Tangier
airport, that authorities cooperatively had tigntened up on drug
trafficking considerably over the last five years on both sides of
the border and Strait. He recounted that he used to know a lot of
American sailors from Rota that came down through Ceuta to Morocco
in the early and mid-1970* s. 3ut, as more and more were caugnt,
his acquaintences became fewer and fewer. Now, he said, it is rare
that he gets to meet American sailors. He was proud of the fact
that he had known sailors from about 20 different states.
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The Arab Quarter of Ceuta is more segregated from the main
part of the city. By contrast, the Arab Quarter of Melilla is, of
necessity, close to, and somewhat intermingled with, the main part
of that city. This is due primarily to the fact that Ceuta 's nine
square mile area has allowed more room for expansion into the frontier
area than Mel ilia's four square miles. This helps account for the
fact that there were far fewer people in the traditional Moroccan
caftan in downtown Ceuta than the many in the heart of Mel ilia, whose
Arab Quarter is quite nearby.
There are two general categories of Moroccans in the city
enclaves:
1. Those who live there.
2. A floating population, i.e., those that enter daily by the
frontier border. This figure is between 6,000 and 3,000,
and includes maids and other laborers, as well as those who
come to trade.*
The Spanish Government in Ceuta and Melilla officially divides
the Moroccan population into four groups:
1. Moroccans with Spanish nationality (Spanish passports).
2. Moroccan nationals legally registered in Ceuta or Melilla
with official residence permission. A subcategory here is
the relatives of these legally-registered Moroccan nationals.
3. People with special cards who worked in the Spanish Protec-
torate before Moroccan independence and are neither Moroccan
nor Spanish.
4. Clandestine residents.
*The floating population is the one which apparently is responsible




Although the official total of special Moroccans in Ceuta is
12,000, I was told, unofficially, that this official number is always
lower than the actual figure. The difference is, no doubt, from the
clandestine residents with forged papers and the like.
While I was at the government delegate's office, I observed
a Moroccan woman with a special identification card waiting to see
one of the top Spanish officials. She was a large woman, appeared
to be in her 30' s, was dressed in a caftan, and wore no veil. Pre-
sumeably with the special card, she would fit into the third category
above. She was trying to get a special permission slip, possibly
regarding medical care, signed by an official. Both she and the
clerks conducted their business in Spanish. They all worked fairly
patiently as she continued her way up the chain of command explain-
ing her situation in Spanish to each one as she went. Eventually,
the permission slip was taken from her to the official, apparently
the government delegate, who signed it. The clerk brought it out of
the delegate's office and the woman was on her way.*
3. Government
Ceuta has a civil government, and the city is administered as
a municipality of the Cadiz Province. The Information Attache at the
Spanish Embassy in Washington, D.C., indicated in a letter response
(dated 29 July 1982) to my query regarding Ceuta and Mel ilia that
".
. . the position of the Spanish Government is to consider them as
Spanish Provinces, the same as the rest of the other provinces".
*More discussion of the Moroccan populace is continued in the
section on Mel ilia below.
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He pointed out that "this means that they have representatives in the
Spanish Parliament: Ceuta (one Deputy and two Senators), and Mel ilia
(one Deputy and two Senators)". He finished his description with the
statement: "The Spanish State has total sovereignty over both Provinces."
While it is true that there is a similarity between the provinces and the
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in terms of individual representation in the
Cortes, that is one of the only areas of similarity, although an important one,
Actually, there are 50 Spanish provinces. Ceuta and Melilla are
not included in that figure. Ceuta and Melilla have municipal governments,
and a government delegate ( Delegado del Gobierno ), but no provincial
government . The Delegado del Gobierno has civil authority and answers to
the Ministry of the Interior. "There also is a government subdelegate
and one delegate from each of the ministries,"[Ref . 28]. The Commandancia-
General has military authority. A Mayor is in charge of the municipal
government at the Ayuntami ento (town hall). "Provinces are constituted
by the association of municipalities (3,655 in 1970)", [Ref. 29]. Ceuta
and Melilla are so small, both in area and population that there is no need
to be a province, nor to have a provincial government; the city does it all.
Any provincial administration links that may be required are fullfilled by
Cadiz Province for Ceuta, and by Malaga Province for Melilla.*
Through all of this, however, Ceuta and Melilla remain special
because of their slightly different situations. They are not large
like the other two parts of noncontiguous metropolitan Spain—namely,
the Canary Islands (which constitutes two provinces with over 700,000
people in each) or the Balearic Islands (one province with 640,000 people).
*The other minor enclaves also are administered by Malaga Province,
but little, if any, civil administration is required at those garrisons.
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On the other hand, some of Spain's 50 provinces have popula-
tions in the same range as the combined total of 120,000 of Ceuta and
Mel ilia. For example, Soria, a province in the Old Castile Region
has only 105,000 people; Guadalajara Province in the New Castile
Region has 144,000; Teruel Province in Aragon and Segovia Province in
Old Castile have less than 160,000 each, [Ref. 30]. In each of these
cases, however, the provinces are much more spread out and nave many
small municipalities. Therefore, it appears impractical to grant full
provincial status to the tiny pieces of sovereign territory in North
Africa.
3y the same token, it is advantageous to have an administra-
tive link in mainland Spain, such as Cadiz and Malaga Provinces, to
which the noncontiguous cities of Ceuta and Mel ilia can be anchored.
4. Armed Forces
The Army is a major interest group in the enclaves in general,
and in Ceuta and Me 1 i 11 a in particular. In 1981, the Army had 9,000
soldiers deployed to Ceuta. The makeup included one armored cavalry
regiment, one Foreign Legion regiment, one coastal artillery/AA
regiment, one engineering regiment, two Regulares battalions, one
light cavalry group, and one special sea unit, [Ref. 31].
The Foreign Legion was considered the best combat unit in the
service. It was formed in Morocco after Spanish officers had ob-
served the performance of the French Foreign Legion and decided to
model a Spanish unit after it. Spain's legion never acquired the
international flavor of its French counterpart, even though for
many years a number of its men were Moroccan. In 1975, the legion
was composed largely of Spanish troops; discipline was strict,
and morale was high, [Ref. 32].
Further discussion of the Army's historical role in Morocco is developed
in Chapter III, History.
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Although the Navy works out of Ceuta periodically, and has
some constant presence, it does not have a major naval base there.




with its VSTOL aircraft and helicopters, occur approximately
three or four times per year. It is likely that some inshore patrol
launches, and possibly some of the new fishery protection cutters that
were scheduled to be built, are maintained there.
There is no runway at Ceuta, and consequently, no Air Force
presence. A military heliport, which is under construction, likely
will be used by helicopters of all three services.
5. Economy
Ceuta has no major mineral extracts, and no industry for semi-
finished and finished goods. It depends on its business as an excel-
lent Mediterranean port at a major shipping crossroads, its revenues
as one of Spain's four duty-free ports of entry,* and, to a lesser
extent, tourism and fishing.
a. The Port
The city of Ceuta has an excellent natural harbor. Compe-
tition from Gibraltar, 12 nautical miles across the Strait, and Tangier,
24 nautical miles west, and the lack of surrounding productive territory
have prevented its full development. Nonetheless, Ceuta has been classi-
fied as nearly as busy as Bilbao, the second busiest port in mainland
Spain. Palma de Mallorca in the Balerics, and Ceuta, have similar
port statistics in terms of volume of traffic. These statistics include
*The other dutyfree ports are the Canaries, Mel ilia, and Andorra.
Although Andorra is not a part of Spain, Spaniards consider it one of
the dutyfree entry ports.
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all of the ferry entries and exits from Ceuta. Therefore, in terms
of annual tonnage, Ceuta is farther down on the Spanish port facilities
rankings. As a free port, Ceuta has prospered from the border closure
between Spain and Gibraltar, which also is a free port. According to
the Spanish Economic News Service , "the opening of the [Spain-Gibraltar]
frontier will certainly reduce the trade prosperity of Ceuta", [Ref.
33]. If this is true, then it appears that this reduction in Ceuta's
trade prosperity would be yet another way in which the Gibraltar border
opening, or the return of Gibraltar to Spain, could have ill effects on
the enclave issues.
The port facility at Ceuta is much larger and busier than
that of Mel ill a. It is on a cape, and therefore set apart from the
countryside, and gives the impression from a distance, of being a
cleaner, more modern port city than Mel ilia. Mel ilia does have modern
port facilities and cranes on its main pier area, but it is considerably
smaller than Ceuta. (See discussion on Mel ilia's port below.)
Upon entering the port, Ceuta appears to have many more tall,
new buildings than Mel ill a. This gives Ceuta a much more modern look.
There is much more useable pier space in Ceuta than in Mel ilia because
much of Mel ilia's inner harbor is taken up by its beautiful recreational
beach.
Ceuta's location at the busy strait contributes greatly to
its traffic. Whereas, Mel ilia, located 130 nm inside the Mediterranean,,
gets little traffic that is not directly destined for the port itself.
Once ships pass through the Strait of Gibraltar eastbound, most usually they


































the Alboran Sea, they will head more northeasterly for Europe's busy
Mediterranean ports in northern Spain, southern France, or Italy. Even
for ships destined for the eastern Mediterranean, or for North African
ports including Algiers, the most direct route will keep them some 60
nautical miles north of Me 1 ilia.
Although Ceuta's port does not have a polluted appearance,
it pays a price for high traffic. Its port water inside the breakwater
was more polluted than that of Mel ill a.
Ceuta can accomodate more ships than Mel ilia, because of
its layout and development.* During my stay in Ceuta, I observed 10
large cargo ships, and three ferries in port. Even with this many
ships, the port did not appear particularly crowded. There were a
number of empty berths that could accomodate more ships. I could see
only a few ships closely enough to observe nationality. The flags
represented were Germany, Sweden, Norway or possibly Denmark, and the
Soviet Union. The Soviet container ship was from Odessa, and was
berthed at the first pier on the left as one enters port. When that
ship departed. the following day, another Soviet merchant ship came
into port within three hours of the other's departure. Harbor tug-
boats maneuvered it into the same berth that the previous Soviet ship
had occupied.**
*Melilla has a compromise situation with regard to Moroccan usage
which affects its potential capabilities, but based on its present faci-
lities and the lack of natural traffic i t gets due to its location, the
existing Spanish and Moroccan compromise usage seems to serve adequately
Spain's needs, and is a workable solution for the Moroccans to develop
the hinterland south of Nador as well. A fuller discussion of Mel ilia
and its port facility is listed below.
**I place no special significance on the Soviet ships other than the
fact that during my brief stay of less than two days in Ceuta, a
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The port facility at Ceuta had many sport and recreation
boats. In fact, there were rows and rows of pleasure motor craft.
This was in contrast to the fairly small nautical club at Mel ilia
which included some small sailboats for the most part.
The ferries at the port included two that shuttle back
and forth between Ceuta and Algeciras, and one, the Santa Maria de la
Paz , that is used only for the Ceuta/Melilla/Ceuta weekly runs between
the enclaves.* Ceuta is only a one-hour ferry ride from Algeciras.
Since it is a shorter journey than the Algeciras-Tangier connection,
it rivals Tangier as an easy entry to Morocco from Spain, and further
benefits from this easy access.
b. Duty-Free Goods
Since the mid-1 960' s, Ceuta has been a designated duty-
free port of entry for Spain. This designation has no doubt shifted
the local economy from one of fishing primarily, and port activities
to one of small individual commercial trade. By far the most obvious
form of trade with the most numerous outlets is the small appliance,
radio, camera, and watch shops. The number of these small appliance
stores in Ceuta is probably about 500. The products sold range from
portable radios, cassette tape recorders, and stereo equipment,
Soviet merchant ship was present the entire time with tne exception
of three hours when one departed port only to be replaced in \/ery
short order by another. This yielded near-continuous Soviet presence
throughout the 42-hour period of my observation. This may be an
exception, or even a normal situation, and in either case may signify
nothing.
*The Santa Maria de la Paz was built in Valencia in 1967. Its
statistics are: 220 feet long; net tonnage 562.9; gross tonnage 1,199;
crew 36; normal load 250 passengers; maximum load 386 passengers. A
sister ship is the Semana de la Caridad .
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to home video recorders, televisions, pocket cameras, movie cameras,
and 35mm single lens reflex cameras, to digital watches and calcula-
tors. Numerous small kitchen appliances produced in Spain, as well
as sporting goods and leather products, are also sold in large quan-
tities.
The 1981 import/export ratio for Ceuta was 3.94:1. Exact
figures are: imports, 15.172 billion pesetas, or approximately $136
million; exports, 3.859 billion pesetas, or approximately $25 million
dollars.* By contrast, the 1979 import/export ration was 6.86:1.
Exact figures are: imports, 9.607 billion pesetas, or $137.4 million;
exports, 1.389 billion pesetas, or $19.87 million dollars, [Ref. 34].
The difference between the imports and the exports is
significant. Most of the imported items are sold in the small shops
at the lower duty-free prices to individual customers, and therefore
do not show up in the overall totals.
Of special interest is the countries from which Ceuta
imports. In 1981, Japan was first, providing 29 percent of all of
Ceuta's imports. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union was second, supplying
15 percent of Ceuta's 1981 imports. Ceuta imported more from the
Soviet Union than from any other European country. The commodities
which Ceuta imports from the Soviets were not indicated. Third over-
all, France supplies 10 percent of Ceuta's imports. The last seven,
each supplying less than seven percent are: China, Benelux, U.S.,
U.K., Hong Kong, Federal Republic of Germany, and Taiwan. Ceuta




officially imports less than 0.03 percent of its goods from Morocco.
Exports figures show that 99 percent of Ceuta's official exports go
to foreign ships. Although I am unable to document this information,
I was advised that both Ceuta and Mel ilia levy a 10 percent local
surcharge on all imported goods immediately on entry into the port.
This 10 percent goes into the city coffers, making the city treasuries
among the most affluent in Spain, without high taxes. The cities of
Ceuta and Mel ilia therefore do not suffer from a lack of funds for
local projects, municipal buildings, parks, improvements and repairs,
as do many of the cities and towns in the mainland.
The goods that are bought at the stores, tax-free, are
either taken back to the mainland, or to the tourist's home country,
or, as Morocco claims, smuggled into Morocco. The Moroccan Govern-
ment says this deprives them of import revenues, and promotes a large
black market. On the other hand, it provides a livelihood for the
people of the surrounding Riff. The Riff is one of the poorest and
most neglected areas in terms of economic development in all of Morocco.
Further discussion of smuggling is continued below,
c. Fishing
The importance of fishing has dropped off somewhat in Ceuta
for a number of reasons. The Moroccan authorities imposed restrictions
on foreign fishing by extending the boundaries on territorial and
economic waters, and subsequently, seizing boats and crews. In the
years between 1970 and 1980, the number of fishing boats registered
in Ceuta has steadily decreased. In 1970, 143 fishing boats were
registered in Ceuta, totalling 2,111 tons. By 1973, the number of
fishing boats had dropped to 65, totalling 730 tons. Figures for 1980
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were 57 boats, 824 tons, [Ref. 35]. Tonnage of catch was 2,700 tons
in 1971, and 1,900 tons in 1980. Over 3,000 tons were caught in each
of the four years 1974, 1976, 1977, and 1978. 3y comparison, figures
from the early 1960's indicate that Ceuta had a 6,000 ton per year
fishing industry, [Ref. 36].
d. Tourism
Ceuta continues to promote tourism, and is expanding its
capabilities. In 1975, Ceuta was one of the areas singled out (along
with San Sebastian and Santander in northern Spain) to share govern-
ment loans of two billion pesetas for hotel construction, [Ref. 37].
Ceuta's location as a convenient port of entry from Spain
to Morocco gives it a large volume of passenger and vehicle traffic.
It was the second busiest port in Spain in 1980 in these two areas,
[Ref. 38]. Efforts have been made to encourage some of the large
volume of tourist traffic going between Europe and .Morocco to stay
in Ceuta for a day or two, either coming or going.*
Ceuta's accomodations include two four-star hotels, one
three-star hotel, and 11 smaller pensiones and hotel-residences. In
addition, there are a number of rooms that are rented out by local
families in their homes or apartments. In all, there are 36
*Rather than simply promoting the day bus trips to Ceuta from
Malaga, tour groups are brought down from Malaga to stay overnight.
I observed a large group of British tourists that checked into my
hotel for a two-night stay in Ceuta. They arrived Saturday night,
and were scheduled to tour on Sunday, presumeably visiting part of
Morocco as well. Monday was for shopping in Ceuta. Monday after-
noon or evening they were to return to Malaga. This apparently was




establishments with 566 rooms, [Ref. 39]. Tourist beaches are on
the south side of the cape, away from the port. They are fairly
narrow, with coarse sand and stones rather than the fine sand that
characterizes Mel ilia's beaches. With some excellent stretches of
beach which Morocco has developed from just south of the Ceuta fron-
tier, to southeast of Tetouan, Ceuta 's beaches have no major drawing
as a tourist attraction,
e. Smuggling
Smuggling is a problem which is extremely difficult to
document. Based on accounts by some of the residents, it is fairly
widespread. However, the term "smuggling" apparently is used to
describe a wide range of activities. I was told by some residents
of Mel ilia, for example, that smuggling ranges from small to medium
to large-scale operations.
The small-scale includes such things as a Moroccan woman
bringing fruit or eggs to sell at the market in Ceuta or Mel ilia. She
returns to Morocco with a blanket or a radio to resell at a market in
Morocco.
The medium-scale smuggling can get fairly sophisticated,
with the use of a special smuggler's girdle. The individual enters
the city via the frontier border. Dressed in a caftan, the appearance
is that of a thin person. The individual makes duty-free purchases at
the various radio, camera, and watch outlets. 3efore crossing the
border to return to Morocco, the individual goes into an alley, unpacks
the items and places them in the special girdle. Then, leaving a pile
of empty boxes behind, a fat person in a caftan crosses the frontier
border at the end of the day, returning to Morocco. Small bribes may
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be involved here in order to pass through Moroccan customs.* The large-
scale operations are likely to be quite sophisticated, and likely
include bribes to local Moroccan officials, or the soldiers** who do
the inspection at the border. The residents told me of one instance
in which authorities caught a man who had a garage that was right on
the border. It had two openings. He would fill his bus with goods,
and in the evening he would pull it into the garage via the door on
the Spanish side. The next morning, he would drive it out of the door
on the Moroccan side.
Whether or not these descriptions are completely factual,
they are indicative of the type of discussions that go on regarding
smuggling in the region. It is the type of thing Spanish officials
try to play down. Moroccan officials who want to present the enclaves
in a certain way try to emphasize this subject. Whatever is the
magnitude of the problem, the careful customs check which I observed
at the Ceuta border between Spain and Morocco was by the Moroccans,
*With regard to bribes, Moroccan customs officials would not allow
me to take some of my research papers into the country because they
were considered ethnically sensitive. A Moroccan guide who observed
this situation approached me in the no-man's land between the two
customs gates and asked how much the papers were worth to me, and said
that he could get them across if I so desired.
**Another example of such activity is illustrated by the rather
unusual question asked of me at the final check in the Casablanca air-
port. The guard asked the usual question regarding the prohibition of
taking Moroccan dirham out of the country. He then asked, as he was
going through my bags, how much American money I had. He asked the
same question of two other U.S. Government employees that were on the
same flight. On the other hand, this may have been a single isolated
soldier. I observed some extremely conscientious individual young
soldiers performing their duty well in other instances.
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and not the Spaniards. Long lines and delays characterized the entry
into Morocco. Swift and smooth flow of traffic characterized the
passage into Ceuta, which is only natural as it is a free port.
Money-changing is another form of smuggling which I observed
as well. During the evening, while awaiting transportation from the
port at Mel ill a, a Moroccan in western dress approached me and asked if
I needed change. After my negative reply, he asked if I had any dirhain
or dollars that I wanted to get rid of. He had a special rate. When
I advised him that it was illegal, he became quite concerned and said
that it was none of my business. He then showed me a large roll of
money, and bragged that he had dirham, dollars, pesetas, francs, marks
and pounds. He said he would do whatever he liked, and then he left
the port building.
6. Communications
Ceuta has 33 miles of roads, and 1,889 cars (1978). Although
a 1965 National Geographic map of the area shows a ras'lroad linking
Ceuta with Tetuoan, other more current maps from different sources do
not have this depicted. If the railway is still in place, apparently
it is inactive. I observed no train connections from Ceuta to Tetuoan,
and saw none mentioned in any of the travel literature. The railway
line probably stopped being used after the protectorate was disestab-
lished in the 1950's.
Ceuta has no television station of its own. It has a repeater
station for Spanish national radio and television. The Middle East and
North Africa, 1981-82 lists a local commercial radio station, Radio




Passenger and automobile ferry service connects Ceuta with
Algeciras on the Spanish mainland. There are at least eight round
trips daily between 0800 and 2200 hours, with five round trips on
Sunday. During the tourist season, as many as 15 round trip passages
are made daily. The crossing takes one hour.
As mentioned previously, a weekly ferry connects the North
African enclaves. It departs Ceuta at 2330 hours on Monday, stops at
Penon de Velez and Alhucemas on Tuesday morning, and arrives at
Mel ill a on Tuesday afternoon. Every other Thursday, the ferry goes
from Mel ilia to Chafarinas in the morning and returns in the afternoon.
Persons not in the Spanish military must obtain permission from the
military commander of Mel ilia before a ticket can be purchased for the
trip to Chafarinas. Requests usually are granted if there is approxi-
mately two days prior notice. The ferry departs Melilla for the return
trip to Ceuta at 2315 hours on Thursday. It again stops at Alhucemas
and Penon de Velez on Friday morning, and arrives at Ceuta at 1300
hours on Friday evening.*
There are no air facilities at Ceuta. The nearest airports
are in Morocco at Tetuoan, 20 miles south, or at Tangier, 50 miles
west by car. Gibraltar is the closest airfield to Ceuta at 12 nauti-
cal miles across the Strait by boat. There are no direct connections
*Disembarking at Penon de Velez and Is! a Alhucemas is for Spanish
military only unless by prior permission. Other than those civilians
accompanied by military personnel, or with military business, no
others may disembark from the ferry. The ferry captain, accompanied
by an Army major who was enroute to duty at Alhucemas, went to the
rock and returned after a stay of about 30 minutes.
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between Ceuta and Gibraltar. The military heliport under construction
at Ceuta is expected to be expanded to handle civil helicopters within
two to three years of opening, [Ref. 41].
Ceuta has direct-dial telephone service to the mainland, and
overseas capability via Madrid. There were 10,789 phones, one for
each 6.5 inhabitants in 1978. Telegraph service is available.
Ceuta has four year-around cinemas, and four summer outdoor
cinemas. There are two daily newspapers: Diario de Ceuta , and El Faro
de Ceuta . In the Saturday edition of the papers published during my
stay in Ceuta, each paper ran an article on Ceuta and its future.
Whether it is an often written about subject, or just an isolated
instance, is unknown. There also was an article on the proposed Strait
of Gibraltar bridge. It condemned the project.* Special coverage was
given to happenings across the Strait in the towns around Algeciras 3ay.
Especially Diario de Ceuta gave the impression of close contact between
southern Spain and Ceuta in its local news, advertising, and sports
coverage.
7. Religion, Education, and Health
There are a number of Roman Catholic churches in Ceuta, and
at least one mosque in the Arab quarter. In 1980-81, there were 13,778
students in preschool, middle school, secondary schools, and special
education schools in Ceuta. There were 399 teachers. (These figures
include a small number of private schools.) Preschool students numbered
2,000, with 51 teachers; middle school (E.G.B., Educacion General Basica,
Discussion of this area of potential cooperation between the two
countries is contained in Chapter V.
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ages eight to 14), 11,000 students and 323 teachers; special education,
53 students and 9 teachers. Those students in B.U.P. ( Bachillerato
Unificado Polivalente ) , university preparation, number 1,721 students
with 93 teachers. This figure is down from 4,400 in 1969-70, apparently
due in large part to a massive reduction in scholarship aid and free
education at that level which occurred between 1970 and 1974, [Ref. 42].
Ceuta has one main hospital, and three clinics.
C. MELILLA
Mel ilia is the other large city enclave in North Africa. It is located
on the east side of the very distinctive Cabo de Tres Forcas (also called
Cap de Trois Forches, or Cape Uarc). The cape extends approximately
15 nautical miles into the Mediterranean. The so-called "Mel ilia anchor-
age" is a popular Soviet West Mediterranean anchorage because of the
protection afforded on either the east side or the west side of the
cape, depending on the prevailing winds and weather. Helilla's posi-
tion, 90 nautical miles south of the Spanish mainland and 130 nautical
miles east southeast of Gibraltar, puts it out of the mainstream of
Mediterranean shipping traffic. It is much less accessible from the
Spanish mainland than Ceuta. Daily round trip ferry service connects
Mel ilia with Malaga, eight hours away. Another ferry route connects
Mel ilia with Almeria on the southeastern coast of southern Spain. It
also is an eight hour trip.
As mentioned previously, there are five flights daily that connect
Mel ilia with Malaga. Scheduled air service also is available to
Almeria, These types of ferry and air services keep Mel ilia, an





Map 8. Mel ilia (Detail). Note: Runway added, position approximate;
Breakwater (dashed line) is approximate.
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A general feeling of isolation still prevails, however, as the city
is half-surrounded by Morocco, and has no view of mainland Spain,
as Ceuta has.
Melilla has an area of four square miles. Its shape is almost
like a half-moon, with the old fortress on high ground in the center,
and the main port facility below it. The frontier is between 1.5
and 2.2 miles from the fortress and the ferry terminal. The boundaries
of the city are said to have been decided by connecting the impact
points of cannonballs fired in various directions from the old fortress.
Some variations appear in the boundaries as adjustments were made
around the Moslem cemetary of Si di Guariach where the tomb of a
Moroccan saint is located.
The city of Melilla is divided into two primary areas: Old Melilla,
the very small area where the old fortress stands, and New Melilla,
the rest of the city. Parts of New Melilla probably were built at
the turn of the century.
Climatically, Melilla is generally the same as Ceuta. Its average
monthly temperatures are generally a few degrees warmer than those of
Ceuta. Drought has struck the area for the past few years, which has
put water at a premium. The prevailing winds are out of the north
and northeast, referred to locally as Poniente and Levante , respectively,
A five-to-ten knot wind blows almost constantly to cool the city.
At times, the area gets extremely heavy winds which interrupt flight
operations at the airport. Rough seas are associated with these heavy
winds as well. Tourist literature from Melilla claims there are 200
clear days per year. Occasionally, fog sets in and remains over the
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area for days, also prohibiting flight operations and air connections
to mainland Spain.*
1 . People
The population of Mel ilia is 53,593 as of 1 March 1981. With
transient military families and tourists, the figure is raised to
58,449, based on information provided by the head of the statistics
section of the Government Delegate's office in Mel ilia.** When I
asked the official what the ethnic Moroccan population was in Mel ilia,
the immediate response was 12,000 (officially, 12,200). The actual
figure unofficially is probably around 15,000. I asked why the dif-
ference, and he said it was "like the Chicanos in California". The
12,000 figure means that twenty-two percent of Melilla's population
*Such heavy fog conditions occur only periodically. The fog will
form and last for two-to-four days. This may occur two or three times
a month. Then it may not happen again for six months. The resident
who recounted this to me said that on the days that the airport is
closed for fog, a feeling of being totally cut off from the mainland
exists. He made no mention of fog affecting the ferry runs.
Population statistics quoted for both Mel ilia and Ceuta have
varied widely between 50,000 and 100,000. The 100,000 figure often
is quoted in travel books such as Nagel 's and Fodor's , [Ref. 43].
A Spanish Government hotel guide published in 1975 gave Ceuta 's popu-
lation as 70,092 in one place, and 75,000 in another. The same book
gave Melilla's population as 77,877 in one place, and as 100,000 in
another. Census figures in various atlases and yearbooks show similar
disparity in population reporting. The figures given here are those
provided by the Government Delegate's office. When compared to the
figures of the 1950's, 1960's and early 1970's, the population of each
city seems to be in a gradual decline. One still notices the presence
of many children and young people in both cities. The education
figures for each city confirm this as well. It appears that between
25 and 30 percent of the population of each city is under age 21.
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is ethnic Moroccan. The Spanish officials make every effort to keep
it at about that percentage.*
The Moroccan influence in Mel ilia is much more evident than in
Ceuta. Although its appearance still is that of any typical Andalusian
city, one sees many more people dressed in the traditional caftan in
Mel ilia. There are two probable reasons for this. First, the city is
so small that one must walk through the center of town to get from
the main border gate to the Arab bazaar area, or anywhere else in the
city. Secondly, unlike Ceuta which has heavy contact with peninsular
Spain 10 nautical miles north,Melilla has historically had stronger
economic links with the Moroccan interior. For example, the exploita-
tion of the iron mines south of Melilla was a major commercial factor
in Mel ilia's development during the Protectorate. Although these ties
may be less significant today than at other times in the past, the popu-
lation of Melilla seems to have relatively more Moslem ties than does
that of Ceuta.
Many Mel i Hans, especially those of military families, aave
lived there for years. Some families have had military men serving in
the Melilla garrison for five and six generations. It is a military
tradition. On the other hand, I was told by some residents that
Spaniards from the mainland, especially professionals and skilled
laborers, were drawn to work in Melilla by special pay incentives.
*I spoke with a British woman who is an English teacher at the
local language school. She acted as interpreter during my interview
with the statistics official at Melilla. She was married to a Moroc-
can man who had been trying to get an official residence card and
working papers for almost one year. Without those papers he could
not work officially in Melilla. He had to leave the city and go to
Morocco every three months and renew his visa.
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Teachers, for example, usually stay in Mel ilia for about five years.
Government employees are paid approximately 50 to 60 percent higher
salaries than those on the peninsula. It is an excellent opportunity
to make money. If both adults in a family work, together they can
earn four times the amount that one of them would make in Spain,
where only one of them may be able to work, due to the unemployment
situation.
After a person has lived in Mel ilia for a certain period of
time, he may purchase a car duty-free. He must then drive it in
Mel ilia for one year before he can take it back to the mainland tax-
free. In this way, one can buy a Mercedes, for example, at a price
that is below even the price of the car in Germany. Families usually
accumulate a substantial savings of one or two million pesetas ($9,000
to $18,000) after working in Melilla, because of the higher salaries.
I was told that not too many individuals buy property in Melilla
because they do not feel secure there. Conversely, I observed several
new condominium apartments along the beach area. There also were at
least seven large construction cranes working on new buildings in town.
There usually is some tension at the border as a Spaniard
crosses into Morocco from Melilla. Harassment is the norm, and usually
takes the form of delays of up to two hours, depending on the whim of
the Moroccan border guard. Often Spaniards will go to the Moroccan
town of Nador, ten miles south of Melilla, for produce or for a change
of scenery. The United States has Peace Corps volunteers at "Jador.
The same groupings of Moroccans discussed above for Ceuta
apply for Melilla. There are officially 6,000 to 8,000 day workers
in Melilla, which includes maids, for example. One resident said he
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thought the figure was more like 20,000. He said that many use illegal
cards, and therefore often are not on the official record books. If
this were the case, however, such a discrepancy would show up on any
count that was kept by the Spanish border guards. The official figures
seem to be realistic. Apparently it is not unusual for Moroccans to
come great distances from the interior to buy certain goods and appli-
ances in Mel ilia. One resident told me that people come from towns
and villages "up to 400 kilometers" (250 miles) away to purchase such
things as small kitchen appliances, and even refrigerators, which are
either not available or much more expensive in Morocco.
The older people in Melilla seem to harbor more prejudices
with regard to the Moroccans than do the younger ones. It was Melilla
that suffered and was threatened so often during the 1909-26 Riff War.
Those involved in that war, and also possibly their children, likely
help to keep prejudice and distrust alive in Melilla. For example, a
taxi driver with whom I spoke was born in Melilla. He was possibly in
his late 50*s or early 60' s. As we drove from the airport, he nearly
hit two young Moroccan women who were crossing the street at a stop
sign. Subsequently, he spoke to them very disparagingly. Although
this may not be usual for a taxi driver, it appeared that since they
were dressed in caftans, he assumed he had the right-of-way.
On the other hand, one of the Spaniards at the tourist office
was telling me about his children. He said he had a 13 year old son
who was studying two languages at school: English and Arabic. If this
is an example of the type of education which the younger generation is
receiving in Melilla, it may be the basis for establishing greater
sensitivity, cooperation and understanding between the two countries.
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If such programs were fostered by both countries, the interaction
between the cultures at the commercial ports of Ceuta and Mel ilia could
play a key role in building more positive relations between the two
countries.
The Indian and Jewish minorities were identified as important
ones in Melilla by my other interpreter, a Spaniard from Sevilla. He
said that the two groups owned between 60 and 70 percent of the trade
in Melilla. Such estimates may have no bearing on actual figures, as
certain prejudices may exist. The Spanish Government has made an
effort to control the amount of foreign ownership of businesses in
the enclaves. If these minorities have Spanish passports, then the
ownership estimates may be valid.
Rezette mentions that Melilla has a Chinese Quarter. I asked
about this while in Melilla and was told that it is Chinese in name
only. My university professor-interpreter said there are no Chinese
in Melilla as Rezette implies. It is simply the name of a group of
shops.
2. Armed Forces
The Army maintains 10,000 soldiers in Melilla. The makeup is
the same as that of the Ceuta garrison. Melilla has the second high-
est concentration of troops outside mainland Spain. The Canary Islands
command has 16,000 troops for nearly 2,800 square miles, and 1.6 million
people. By comparison, Melilla has 10,000 troops for four square miles,
and less than 60,000 people. Based on the relative isolation, distance
from the Spanish mainland, lack of natural fortifications, lack of
an extended frontier like Ceuta, Mel ilia's present vulnerability, and
past experience, anticipation of problems in the area may be well founded.
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Some Navy presence is likely. As referred to previously,
periodic port visits by Navy ships, including the aircraft carrier
Dedal
o
are planned quarterly, according to a Spanish Navy Matador
(i.e., Harrier pilot). He told me that Ceuta and Mel ilia were not
among his favorite port visits because both cities were too much
like the surrounding Moroccan countryside. There was little of
interest to offer visiting ships.*
No Air Force presence was observed at the Mel ilia airport.
The POD Flight Information Publication (Enroute) Supplement, Europe ,
North Africa, and Middle East indicates that the Mel ilia airfield,
which was built in about 1963, is a civilian field and not for joint
military use as is often the case with airfields on the mainland. The
hard-surfaced, 3,200 foot runway, oriented 140/320 (northwest/south-
east), could accomodate propel lor transports, the Spanish Navy's VSTOL
Matadors, and Army, Navy, and Air Force helicopters if required. Non-
VSTOL jets could not operate from Mel ilia's airport.
Many of the military people stay in Mel ilia as long as they
can. They receive a special pay differential as do so many of the
workers in Melilla. Officers and noncommissioned officers bring their
families to Melilla. With 10,000 soldiers in a four square mile area,
it is obvious that the soldiers are virtually everywhere. On the
other hand, young children and teenagers are everywhere as well. This
makes Melilla seem less military-oriented, and more family-oriented.
*The excellent Melilla beaches, duty-free goods, historic fortress,




Melilla has a civil governor, and is under the civil administra-
tion of Malaga Province. There is a military commander as well. One
of the police guards at the entrance to the port told me that the mili-
tary "governor" was more powerful than the civil governor in Melilla.
This may be plausible, unofficially, in Melilla, because of its relative
distance and frontier environment. Whereas in Ceuta I was told by tne
Government Delegate that he and the military commander worked closely,
but that he, the civil authority, was in charge. Representation in
the Cortes is the same as discussed for Ceuta.
4. Natural Resources
Eighty percent of Mel ilia's water comes from wells that are in
the city. The remainder comes from wells located in Morocco, but which
are Spanish owned. During the Spanish Protectorate (1912-1956), the
Spaniards improved agriculture in the area surrounding Melilla, and
during this time, built irrigation channels and dams. Up until the
early 1960's, hydroelectric power was supplied to Melilla by one of
those projects. Rezette says that five electric power stations were
built by the Hispano/Moroccan Gas and Electric Company, and the National
Electric Company. Melilla now is a supplier of electric power to some
of the surrounding Moroccan territory, [Ref. 44]. The Muluya River has
an irrigation system which provides water to crops on either side of it.
Melilla serves as a market for the sale of much of the produce grown in
the area. This includes wheat and barley, tobacco, some cotton, figs,
olives, dates, bananas, as well as goats, sheep, some cattle, leather
products and wood, [Ref. 45].
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It is important to note that all this agricultural area, and
whatever minerals exist in this region, are not in Mel ilia nor in
Spanish-held territory. It would hurt the Moroccans in the surround-
ing area, as well as the Mel i Hans, if the border between the two
were to be closed. Morocco was apparently trying to reduce the depend-
ence of this part of Morocco on the city of Mel ilia by developing the
town of Nador. With the building of Morocco's own breakwater at
Mel ilia harbor, these plans for development of Nador now may have a
lower priority, [Ref. 46]. The Moroccan Government is extending its
breakwater at Mel ilia to take advantage of the deepest part of the
harbor. (See Map 8, and Photo 6.) The Spanish breakwater already
has deep water access.
5. Commerce
a. Duty-Free Sales
The same type of shops are evident in Mel ilia as in Ceuta.
Foodstuffs, shoes, textiles, and drinks are a major portion of the
trade as well, [Ref. 47]. Some shops sell Moroccan handicrafts,
including leather and brass goods. There is an open air bazaar in
the Arab Quarter with shoes, clothing, leather goods, and brass for
sale by sidewalk vendors.
In 1981, Melilla's import/export ratio was 5.3:1. Actual
figures were: imports, 6.322 billion pesetas, or $57 million; exports,
1.192 billion pesetas, or $17.3 million dollars. Japan supplied 33
percent of all of Melilla's imports. Hong Kong was second with 16
percent. Each of the following supplied less than eight percent of
Melilla's imports: China (eight percent), Germany (seven percent)
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Taiwan (six percent), U.K. (five percent), Benelux (four percent),
South Korea (two percent), Singapore (two percent), and Morocco (1.5
percent). The U.S. provided less than 0.5 percent of Melillian
imports. Imports from the Soviet Union were valued at less than
$10,000, [Ref. 48].
b. Fishing
Mel ilia is known for its excellent seafood. The fishing
industry does not play as large a role in Mel ilia's economy as it did
in the past. There are only about 40 small fishing boats registered
in Mel ilia now. They are equipped with large lights to attract the
fish. As the ferry departed Mel ilia at 2330 hours, enroute to Ceuta,
I observed the bright lights of these small boats which were fishing
in Mar Chica, the bay area between Melilla and Chafarinas. The fish-
ing boats return in the morning with the overnight catch.
About 30 of the fishing boats belong to Spaniards. The
other ten belong to Moroccans. Moroccan fishing boats are said to
work out of Mel ilia, rather than Mador, the small Moroccan port south
of Mel ilia, because there is no ice in the Moroccan port, gas is
cheaper in Mel ilia, and the fishermen get more money for their catch
in Mel ilia than they do in Nador.
c. Port Facility
As mentioned previously, due to Mel ilia's location, com-
mercial shipping does not have nearly the significance there that it
has in Ceuta, Consequently, Melilla's port is not nearly as busy as
that of Ceuta. The ferries were the only ships I observed coming and
going during my two days of observation.
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There are four large loading cranes, and the Spanish break-
water located on the north side of the harbor appears new and in excel-
lent condition. A railroad track is shown to be in place on maps of
the northern breakwater and pier. It was not used while I was there,
and did not appear to have been used for some time.
A.. covered trestle loading dock juts into the center of the
port. It is no longer in use. In the days of the Protectorate, this
loading dock was connected by a small railway which linked Melilla with
the low-grade iron ore region to the south, in Morocco.
A long southern breakwater of the harbor is Moroccan. This
is a new development since 1979, and may be a significant breakthrough
in terms of Spanish/Moroccan compromise in the area. Only a very small
south pier is shown on maps dated 1975. This pier remains in place.
It is not used very much, and appears to be undeveloped. It is situated
directly in front of the Moroccan pier. The Moroccan breakwater and
pier include a holding and short-term storage area. Construction work
on the facility was still underway through September 1982. Two
Moroccan ships were berthed at the pier.
One of the Moroccan complaints regarding Spain's continued
presence in Melilla was that it denied Morocco the deep water port
that Morocco needed to develop the iron ore region south of Nador. As
mentioned previously, the port at Nador is too shallow for large ships,
although dredging probably has been done in an attempt to change the
situation. The existence of the Moroccan side of the port of Melilla
may demonstrate that some compromise already has occurred for mutual
coexistence in the area. On the other hand, it may be a unilateral
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move by the Moroccans to work around the Spanish presence, and therefore
gain the facilities that Morocco desires,
d. Tourism
Attempts have been made to attract tourists to Mel ill a.
There have been varying degrees of success. During the summer, Spaniards
from the mainland are drawn by the beaches and duty-free goods. Some
French, German, Swiss, and Austrian tourists also apparently frequent
the area during the summer while enroute to Morocco. After driving
south through Spain, the central European tourists would take the over-
night ferry from either Malaga or Almeria to Mel ilia. Many would then
camp the next few nights at campgrounds in Mel ilia. This would give
them an opportunity to enjoy Mel ilia's beaches before crossing into
Morocco to tour the interior. Other accomodations in Mel ilia include
one four-star hotel, one three-star, and ten one- and two-star hotel
-
residences and pensions.
A large placard in the center of town boasted of a recent
soccer championship which was hosted by the city of Mel ilia. Teams
from Portugal, Hungary, Germany, and the Spanish mainland, including
Malaga, played in the tournament. I was told by a representative of the
National Tourist Office that Mel ilia's team was considered yery good
in the tournament.
The National Tourist Office is not located in close prox-
imity to the port, nor to the center square (as it is in Ceuta). It
is on a side street in a residential area, some distance away from the
main stream of traffic. Tourism is not one of Mel ilia's major areas
of commerce. If there is a major reemphasis to attract more tourists,
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the movement of the tourist office to the port facility, or near the
downtown plaza likely will be one of the first indications.
Each year in May, Mel ilia hosts an international film
festival called "International Film Week of Melilla". The 1982
event included film entries from Spain, France, Italy, Britain, the
United States, Poland, and Mexico,
e. Smuggling
Smuggling apparently is as important a factor in Melilla
as it is in Ceuta. Much of the preceding discussion on smuggling
applies for both Ceuta and Melilla. Documentation of the smuggling
situation is ^ery difficult. Accounts vary widely, for example, note
the following comment:
Smuggling in Ceuta and Melilla in the direction of Morocco
is tolerated as the only way to furnish the Riffs, a \zery poor
people, with some means of subsistence. People would have to
be crazy when they live 50 kilometers from Ceuta or Melilla to
buy products in Spain or Morocco that they can pay a quarter or
a third of the price for in the two ports, [Ref. 49].
The degree of tolerance probably depends on the policy on
a given day, or the size of the bribe to Moroccan customs. Smuggling
to Algeria also may be a factor in the Melilla area.
6. Comnuni cations
Ferries are one of the main connections to mainland Spain.
They link the mainland ports of Malaga and Almeria with Melilla by
daily sailings.* Iberia Airlines has approximately five regularly
*In the Melilla ferry terminal, some Moroccans were waiting to
ride the overnight ferry to Malaga. They were from the area south
of Melilla and Nador, presumeably Oujda. They spoke French, but no
Spanish. They told me they were Moroccan guest workers enroute to
Paris. The ferry was taking them to Malaga where they would board
a train to Paris via Barcelona.
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scheduled flights from Malaga to Mel ilia. During the summer season
there may be more. The 30-minute flight is made in an Iberia-chartered
Aviaco Airlines Fokker-27. The stewardess and flight crew on the
aircraft were Aviaco employees. The Fokker-27 is a twin-engine,
propellor-driven aircraft which carries 44 passengers. The one-way air
fare is about $30. The Iberia ticket agent at Malaga airport said
that every flight to Mel ilia was usually full with a four-to-five
passenger waiting list. My flight was no exception. Passengers
were of all age groups, from old people to families with young children.
I noticed two unusual circumstances about the Mel ilia flight.
First, the flight path for the final approach into Mel ilia took the
aircraft directly over Cabo de Tres Forcas, which is Moroccan territory.
There was no attempt to stay over water for as long as possible, nor to
avoid Moroccan airspace. This is in contrast to the final approach
for landing at Gibraltar. Strict entry point procedures, and bright
orange buoys in the waters of Algeciras Bay mark the line over which
approaching aircraft cannot fly when landing at Gibraltar. The
Moroccans are apparently more tolerant, and place no airspace restric-
tions on flight operations into and out of Mel ilia.
The second unusual occurrence was the checking of passports on
entry into the terminal at Mel ilia. This seemed unusual for a national
flight arriving from another Spanish city. It is not the normal pro-
cedure in peninsular Spain. This further illustrates the difference
between Mel ilia and the mainland.
*0n departure from Mel ill a by ferry, passports were also checked.
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The airport at Mel ill a is equipped with a Visual Approach Slope
Indication system (VASI), and runway lights. It is VHF radio capable
only. Its single wheel loading limit is 18,000 pounds. The only radio
aids to navigation are two low frequency nondirectional radio beacons.
Normal hours of operation are 0800-2000 hours, local. No railway con-
nections are advertized between Mel ilia and any other Moroccan cities.
The old railroad track that used to service the hinterland probably is
still in place.
There is one national television repeater station at Mel ilia.
There also is a local pirate station that operates on Saturdays and
Sundays, and from 0800-1200 hours on Monday through Friday. The
operator of the station was honored as Mel ilia's "Han of the Year" in
1981. In addition to these two stations, Melillans can receive one
Moroccan television station, and one Algerian station.* In addition
to the television stations, there is one FM radio station, Radio
Mel ilia, which broadcasts from 1300-1900 hours.
El Telegama de Mel ilia is Melilla's only newspaper. It is
published every day except Monday. Originally, it was one of the news-
papers that belonged to the institution of Spanish newspapers under
Franco. As of September 1982, it was up for contract, and possibly
would be going out of business. Mel ilia has one central post office.
*The close proximity of Algeria, Morocco, and Mel ilia leads to an
unusual situation with regard to local time zones. In the summer there
are three different local times within 50 miles. When it is 0900 hours
in Mel ilia, it is 0700 hours across the border in Morocco, and 0800
hours in Algeria. The same two-hour time difference exists between
Ceuta and the surrounding Moroccan countryside. After the last Sunday




7. Religion, Education, and Health
There are a number of Roman Catholic churches in Mel ilia, and
at least one mosque.* There were 11,573 preschool, middle school, and
secondary school students in Mel ilia in 1981. There were 1,845 pre-
school students from ages four to six, including 1,224 in public schools,
and 621 in private schools. There were 7,879 E.G.B. ( Educacion General
Basica ) students from ages eight to 14, including 5,051 in public schools,
and 2,818 in private schools. There were 1,849 students in B.U.P.
( Bachillerato Unificado Polivalente ), which is secondary school university
preparation. These included 1,532 in public schools, and 317 in private
schools. There were 85 B.U.P. teachers. Also, 682 students attended
a state-run technical school. Special education for the handicapped
had 66 students. Those enrolled in basic adult education numbered 554,
including 374 in public schools and 180 in private schools. The grand
total of students in Mel ilia was 12,875, with 8,939 in public programs,
and 3,936 in private programs.
For higher education, Mel ilia has a branch of the U.N.E.D.,
( Universidad Nacional de Espana a Distancia ). The branch of U.N.E.D.
at Mel ilia started in 1976, and had its first graduates of the com-
plete six year program in 1982. There also is a teacher training
school, a nursing school, and a social workers school.
There is one civilian hospital, and one military hospital in
Mel ilia.
*The church bells ring at various times during the day, much as
they do in any city in mainland Spain. When one hears the calls of
the muezzin from the local mosque, however, one realizes this is a
city different from the mainland.
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0. THE MINOR ENCLAVES
The "minor places" as the other three enclaves are called, are
much less significant than Ceuta and Mel ilia, and aside from personal
observations like my own, there is yery little current information
available on them. The Middle East and North Africa, 1981-82 indicates
that the 1977 population statistics were: Velez, 71; Alhucemas, 63;
and Chafarinas, 195, [Ref. 50]. No civilian or military breakdown is
given, but this probably is the size of the military detachment. It
appears that they are solely military garrisons now.
Civilian villages that some sources have described, probably ceased
to exist on the enclaves shortly after the Protectorate was disbanded.
Without close coastal ties, it is unlikely that villages would continue
to function on the islands.
The garrisons apparently are maintained as a matter of principle.
The origins of Spanish sovereignty on Velez and Alhucemas date back
to before the 1700's. Chafarinas became Spanish during the 1800' s. If
they were relinquished, a domino effect might be anticipated by the
Spaniards with regard to Ceuta and Melilla. Therefore, at cost and
inconvenience, the island enclaves are maintained.
The minor places are under the nominal civil administration of
Malaga Province. Velez likely has closer general ties with Ceuta,
as it is the first and last stop for the ferry. Alhucemas likely has
closer general ties with Melilla, as it is the first stop for the
inter-enclave ferry both before arrival at Melilla and after departure
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Map 9. Penon de Velez de la Gomera (Detail).










































Penon de Velez de la Gomera
Velez, as it is usually called, is the westernmost of the minor
places. The Area Handbook for Spain implies that the island served as
a garrison outpost in the past, but that it no longer does, [Ref. 51].
It still was being maintained as an active garrison as of September 1982,
A castle is on top of the island, and a few buildings which cling to
the side of the slope make up what was once a village. As mentioned
previously, the island is now connected to Africa by a low sand beach.
Velez is two miles from a coastal Moroccan town named Torres el Kal'a,
formerly called Torres de Alcala when it was Spanish.
2. Alhucemas Island
Alhucemas Island is about midway between the east arid west
extremes of the coastal enclaves. It is located in Alhucemas Bay,
(Ajdir Bay). The bay is nine miles wide and five miles long. .vlaps
show there are actually three islands in the bay, only one of which
is claimed by Spain. The other two, Land Island and Sea Island, are
nothing but long rocks, less than 20 feet above sea level, and are
uninhabited. The rock which is Alhucemas Island is between 150 and
200 feet high. It is less than one mile off of the Moroccan coast.
The 1967 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica says that the island is
1,422 yards offshore, [Ref. 52]. This appears to be correct. However,
the same source says the island is 820 feet high (compare to Gibraltar's
1,398 feet, and Ceuta's Mount Hacho, 636 feet). Close scrutiny of the
manmade structures on the island, and a comparison to the islands
overall height indicates that it is not over 200 feet high. This source
also says that on the island there is the building of the former
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Map 10. Alhucemas Island (Detail).
Source: From Rezette, facing pp. 40-41.
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Spanish presidio. The building was still used by the garrison that
was stationed there in September 1982.
Additional information which is inaccurate regarding the
enclave concerns actual dates when the Spaniards were to have left.
"Occupied by the Spaniards from 1673 to 1961, the Penon had a small
garrison and a few families; all provisions and water were brought
from Spain"
,
[Ref. 53]. This account makes it sound as if the situa-
tion changed in 1961. However, Alhucemas still maintains a garrison
of less than 100 soldiers. Some military dependents were there as
well. Provisions and water must still be brought in from Ceuta and
"lei ilia. The same source observes that the Moroccan town of Al Hoceima,
formerly Villa Sanjurjo, had 11,239 inhabitants in 1960, ". . . the
majority of whom were still Spanish".
According to two individuals with whom I spoke and who had
lived in Al Hoceima after the Protectorate, many of the Spanish had
left. There was still a Spanish school in the town as of 1981.
Many well-to-do Moroccans in the town still sent their children to
the school. The United States has Peace Corps volunteers at Al
Hoceima. One of the volunteers told a former resident that the Al-
hucemas Bay area reminded him a great deal of the San Francisco Bay
area. U.S. ships, 'including the Lemoore County , have made port calls
at the town. Ten miles south of Al Hoceima, the largest Club Med in
Morocco is located. It is directly across the narrow channel opposite
the Spanish garrison on Alhucemas Island. According to Fodor's .North
Africa
, the area is a truly beautiful place for pleasure ooating and
skin diving, and the bay area and valley are carefully being developed
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Photo 9. Alhucemas Island
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by the Moroccan Government, [Ref. 54], A 7,000 foot runway is about
12 miles outside of the town of Al Hoceima. "The area is dry, but
misty in summer." [Ref. 55],
3. Chafarinas Islands
The easternmost enclave, located 14 miles west of the Algerian
border with Morocco, is the Chafarinas Islands. They lie 25 nautical
miles from Mel ilia across Mar Chica (Little Sea). The three islands
are between two and three miles off of the coast, are small and rocky,
and form a semi-circle which could provide for an excellent anchorage.
They have been under Spanish control since 1848. In 1910, the Spanish
Government tried to construct a breakwater and roadway between Isabel II,
the inhabited island in the center, and El Rey, the easternmost island
in the group, which had been used as a cemetery. The plan was to further
enclose this already sheltered and deep anchorage which is able to
accomodate many large ships. In 1914, however, a storm opened a gap
in the breakwater, [Ref. 56]. It apparently was never repaired.
The population figures for the island of Isabel II have ranged
from 500 to 1,000. Most recent figures show 195 in 1977, [Ref. 57].
Probably all of these are military. The island has a lighthouse, a
garrison, and a small village. (See photo of ferry terminal mural
depicting Isabel II.) In 1910, it had ".- . . several batteries,
barracks, and a penal convict settlement", [Ref. 53]. The Islands
are directly off the coast from the Moroccan town of Ras el Ma. Some
fishermen may still live on the island, but generally those only with
official military business, or special permission, may even board the
ferry to the islands. The tourist office organizes an annual picnic
outing to the islands for up to 50 people.
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III. HISTORY OF THE ENCLAVES
A. GENERAL
"Spain in North Africa" and "North Africa in Spain" have been
variations of the same story for 2,000 years. Centered on this area
are the ancient myths of Atlas, for whom North Africa's 13,000 foot
Atlas Mountains are named. The promontories of Gibraltar and Ceuta
formed the "Pillars of Hercules"—the gateway to the ancient world.
In about A.D. 300, the Roman emperor Diocletian, who reigned from
284 to 305, attached the province of Morocco, Mauretania Tingitana,
to the government of the peninsula. According to William Atkinson,
this action "laid the foundation of the Peninsula's later claims to
sovereignty over these territories," [Ref. 59].
Although dating claims back that far seems contrived, there is a
similarity between the Moors and the Iberians, especially in southern
Spain, due to their historical interaction over the last 1,500 years.
Mevill Barbour describes the situation in the following way:
Relations between the two countries have therefore often been
intimate, sometimes friendly, and sometimes hostile, and through-
out history there has hardly been a moment at which some piece
of territory on one shore has not been in possession of the govern-
ment ruling on the other. . . . One can indeed regard the Iberian
peninsula and Morocco, north of the Atlas, as forming a distinct
region intermediate between Europe and Africa, Iberia being cut off
from the rest of Western Europe by the Pyrenees as Morocco is from
the rest of Africa by the Atlas and the Sahara." [Ref. 60].
The prophet Mohammed died in A.D. 632, and in very short order,
Islam spread by conquest to Christian Spain. In 711, Moslems landed
on Gibraltar (Gib al-Tarik) at the invitation of a Visigothic clan,
and returned to Africa after a short stay. They came back to Spain
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the following year intent on conquering the entire peninsula. Although
this was the beginning of 750 years of Moslem presence in Iberia, the
Spaniards mark it as the beginning of the "Reconquest" of Spain from
Moslem domination.
The year was also the beginning of the Moorish invasion of Spain,
and it was launched from Morocco. Here possibly are the beginnings
of what lingers in modern Spain today as the "North Africa threat", or
the idea of the "Threat from the South", [Ref. 61].
It was not until 1415 that the Iberians (Portuguese and Spaniards)
were able to take the war successfully across the Strait by capturing
a piece of Africa.* In 1415, the Portuguese captured Ceuta, and this
success not only launched Portugal on its overseas conquest, but also
gave it a foothold in Africa. This foothold might have been seized much
earlier, because in about 1250, Ferdinand III of Portugal sent forces
into Morocco to harass the Moors, and was planning a subsequent invasion
with a large army when he died. Ferdinand's plan, [Ref. 52], died with
him, and the later taking of Ceuta proved of little more than token
importance. It was not until the 1490's that Spain took Melilla,** and
in 1507, Penon de Velez de la Gomera.
During the period 1509 to 1580, Spain developed enclaves all along
the North African coast. Oran (1509), Bougie (1510), Tripoli (Libya in
*Spain did occupy Penon Island near Algiers from 1302 until the
1500's, but this was not as strategic a foothold as the area closer
to the Strait.
**There are various dates given for the year in which Spain finally
captured Melilla, including 1490, 1492, and 1497. The 1497 date is











Map 12. Dates .of Acquisition
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1510), and Tunis (1535) all fell to the Spaniards as they defeated
the officials that ruled those areas as a part of the Ottoman Empire.
Spain, however, had lost all of these with the exception of Oran by
1580. In the same year, however, and continuing for the next 60 years
(until 1640), the Spanish incorporated Portugal and her dominions
under the Spanish crown. Spain's possession of Ceuta is marked from
1580 at the earliest, or 1668 at the latest, depending on a number of
technical details.* [Ref. 63].
In 1673, Alhucemas Island became Spanish. The following year, in
1674, the Moslems started a 26 year siege of Ceuta which ended in 1700.
Again in 1775, the Moslems layed siege to both Ceuta and Mel ilia.
During the 1780's, the piracy which had so long dominated the western
Mediterranean was beginning to be brought under control.
In 1810, with the Napoleonic Wars and the French threat to Spain,
the British occupied Ceuta at Spain's request. This probably took
the form of reinforcement of the Spanish garrison and a showing of
the flag to demonstrate Britain's resolve to secure the strategic
choke point that was so vital to communications with its Indian Empire.
Ceuta was returned to Spanish control at the end of the Napoleonic
Wars. Ironically, Gibraltar, across the Strait, had been British by
this time for over 100 years.
During the 50 years that Spain and Portugal had the same king, it
is likely that the administration of Ceuta and all other Portuguese
possessions was still accomplished from Lisbon. The year the two
countries split, 1640, Spain assumed control of Ceuta. This may have
been a gradual turnover. In 1668, official documents were signed
regarding Ceuta. The only thing that can be said with certainty in
regard to control of Ceuta, is that it was in European control, net
Moslem control, from 1415 onward, even though there were numerous
unsuccessful Moslem sieges to recover it.
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In 1848, Spain gained control of, and occupied the Chafarinas
Islands. France had planned an expedition with the intent of occupy-
ing the islands, and making them a part of Algeria, but the Spaniards
arrived first.
During the 1850' s, there was open hostility between Spain and the
tribes surrounding Melilla. In 1859, Spain defeated Morocco (O'Donnel's
War), and forced its rulers to pay a large indemnity. Spain also took
advantage of the opportunity to enlarge the territory it held around
Melilla and Ceuta to make it more defensible. During the 1880's, all
of the European powers were moving to obtain what was left unclaimed
in Africa, and Spain gained the barren Rio de Oro (now Western Sahara,
or southern Morocco) and some of the southwest Morocco.
Between 1891-94, the tribes of the Riff besieged Melilla. The
Spaniards sent 25,000 men in response to what has been termed a "minor
police action", [Ref. 64]. This action took place during a time when
the remainder of Spain's colonies in the Americas were in political
upheaval. The "over-officered" army had 29 generals for the force of
25,000 men, [Ref. 65]. The Spanish Army did not want to lose Melilla.
Shortly afterward, in 1898, Spain suffered defeat in the Spanish-
American War, and total collapse overseas, losing its territories in
the Caribbean and the Philippines. These losses were a crushing blow
for the Spaniards in general, and the Army in particular, and further
reinforced the Army's large stake in North Africa.
European Imperialism peaked at this time, and 1898 was also the
year of the British/French confrontation at Fashoda in central Africa.
The British were attempting to link their northern and southern areas
of influence at Cairo and Cape Town. The French were trying to do the
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same to their western and eastern areas of control in Africa, in French
West Africa, and French Somaliland. Spain's losses in the Caribbean
and Pacific placed it in a set of circumstances in which it diligently
could redirect its efforts to the south, i.e., to Morocco and northwest
Africa. It was here that the Spanish State and the Army determined to
make a stand, and to reverse Spain's continued decline.
In Morocco, Spain had to contend with France which was already
firmly entrenched in Algeria to the east. If this were not enough,
Germany, which also was getting interested in African territory, found
Morocco attractive, especially since the French had aggressively
attached themselves there. This German sensitivity and boistrousness,
and French aggressiveness, led to the first Moroccan crisis in 1905-06.
The Algeciras Conference of 1906 gave Spain and France general respon-
sibility for Morocco, under a general agreement in favor of an economic
open door.
By 1909, the garrison at Mel ilia was enlarged to 90,000 troops in
response to tribal attacks. (Contrast this with the present day
population of about 60,000, with 10,000 troops.) The Army did not
intend to lose this area. A "last stand" mentality apparently had
developed. Commencing in 1909 and continuing until 1926, the Riff Wars
were externally the major driving force for Spain, which stayed
neutral during World War I, and held on to Spanish Morocco.
A second Morocco crisis came in 1912-13 with the German gunboat
Panther appearing off Casablanca after the French had sent troops to
the modern capital of Morocco. In 1912, a Spanish Protectorate was
established over northern Morocco. For the first time, the strongholds
of Ceuta and Mel ilia, which had been Spanish for 300 and 400 years,
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ROYO Y GUILOCHE: NIORIR ABRAZADO AL CANON
Photo 11. Cover of Espana en sus Heroes . (One of a 28 issue set
of Spanish military history magazines, published in 1969. At least
20 of the issues deal with the Riff Wars (1909-26). Spain remained
neutral in World Wars I and II. The heroes of the Civil War are
mentioned only briefly. Those issues were unavailable. The Spanish
heroes of the 20th century, therefore, come from the Riff Wars.
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EL CABO NOVAL HA CAIDO PR1SIONERO





BUZIAN: EL MORO LAUREADO
Photo 13: Cover of Fspana en sus Heroes . (Depicting Riff coast.)
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Photo 14. Back Cover of Espana en sus Heroes . (Officer and soldiers




respectively, had substantial frontier areas behind them. The task of
the Army was to pacify the surrounding areas and the Riff tribes. This
was much more difficult, and much less economically productive for the
Spaniards than it was to be for the French in central Morocco.
At home, the "international last stand" mentality of the Army
heirarchy was offset by what Atkinson describes as "the unpopularity
of service in Africa, and liberal denunciation of this 'policy of
conquest' [which] provided the constant scope for agitation," [Ref. 66],
The Riff tribes were led by the infamous Abd el Krim. In 1921, with
Spaniards convinced that the situation in the Protectorate was reason-
ably under control, a massive uprising in which a force of 20,000
Spaniards was nearly destroyed, or "pushed into the sea at Mel ilia",
dealt a staggering blow at home. A total of 70,000 troops were sent
to put down the revolt. In 1926, Abd el Krim surrendered, and with
this act came the end of a costly war. After this successful African
campaign, the Army was more powerful at home than it had ever been
since the 1898 humiliation, [Ref. 67].
Ten years later, Mel ilia and Ceuta were to be decisive again. In
1936, Ceuta was the launching point for Franco's expedition into Spain.
Mel ilia was the first Spanish city to rise against the Republican
Government of Spain.
The three years of Civil War (1936-39) which followed nearly des-
troyed Spain. The country remained neutral in World War II, with the
exception of a division-sized force of volunteers which fought on the
side of the Germans on the Eastern Front. In the ten years from 1946
to 1956, Spain continued to have problems in the Protectorate, as did
France. The Spanish had little choice other than to follow the lead
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of the French, and granted independence to Morocco in 1956. Spain,
however, retained the enclaves, where Spanish presence, except for
Chafarinas, dated back to the first 200 years after the last Moslems
were forced to give up their dominions in Iberia in 1492. Spain also
retained its acquisitions in the south, namely Spanish Sahara, Ifni,
and the Tarfaya region, which dated to the 1880' s.
B. CURRENT SITUATION
In 1958, Spain lost the Tarfaya. In 1969, Spain gave up Ifni. In
1976, 20 years after Morocco had gained independence, Spain gave up
Spanish Sahara. Each time Spain relinquished some other colonial terri-
tory, the issue of the enclaves would temporarily be suspended by the
Moroccans. In 1982, there was nothing else for Spain to give up, except
possibly the Canaries, which are more Spanish than Ceuta or Melilla.
Spain's contention is that all of these are not colonies, but are part
of metropolitan Spain.
The enclaves are the last bastions of Spain in Africa, and indeed,
in the world outside Iberia. They are the remaining token of the period
which began in 1492 when Spain was able to move from 700 years of
being the conquered, to 500 years of being the conquerors. They may
represent, for Spain, the beginnings and the endings of her global
greatness. Unfortunately, they represent for Morocco, the beginning
and ending of foreign domination, and contribute to a well-developed
sense of Arab nationalism.
Conflict from the 1975 Spanish Sahara territorial dispute spilled
over into the areas of fishing rights and the status of the enclaves.
Morocco raised the question of "colonial domination'' at the United Nations
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in January 1975, comparing the enclaves to Gibraltar, and highlighting
Spain's hypocracy in its contrasting views on each, [Ref. 68].
In early February 1975, Spain's Minister of Information declared
that the Spanish Cabinet saw Morocco's position as a threat to Spain's
"territorial integrity".
The Cabinet did not take the challenge lightly, and within
two days, four Spanish destroyers, three attack transports, a
tank-landing ship, two submarines, three marine battalions, and
three helicopter squadrons arrived to "show the flag" in Ceuta
and Mel ilia, [Ref. 69].
On 10 February 1975, Morocco's Foreign Minister sent a protest to
the United Nations about Spanish ships within Morocco's territorial
waters. On 11 February, the ships were withdrawn. On 12 February,
Spain's U.N. representative "rejected Morocco's effort to draw a
parallel with Gibraltar, claiming that the enclaves were historically
and demographically part of Spain, while Gibraltar had no similar
relationship with the British nation", [Ref. 70].
Furthermore, it was argued that the enclaves predated the Spanish
Protectorate, and were administered separately. Morocco had signed
numerous agreements since gaining independence in 1956, less than 20
years prior, which recognized the continued sovereignty of Spain over
the enclaves.
The Spanish Cabinet also ordered 14 million pesetas (about a
quarter of a million dollars in 1975) for development of the enclaves,
and the representative from Ceuta said it would be put to use immediately,
In April 1975, the Sahara resistance movement (Morehab) sent
messages to the U.N., O.A.U., and the Arab League protesting "Spanisn
oppression of Moroccans living in the enclaves", [Ref. 71]. On
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28 April 1975, the Arab League stated that it supported Morocco's
claims regarding Ceuta and Mel ilia.
In May 1975, three bombs injured 12 Spaniards in a cafe in Mel ilia.
In June, a bombing in Ceuta killed one and injured two others. Another
bombing resulted in property damage only. Later, in June, two men were
killed while they reportedly tried to plant a bomb near the Shell depot
in Mel ilia. Subsequently, 36 Moroccans were ordered out of Ceuta because
of their Moroccan Government connections. Rabat Radio reported that
about 400 Moroccans were arrested, and 160 Moroccan families expelled.
[Ref. 72]
Tensions were reduced with the resolution of the Spanish Sahara
dispute. Possibly secret agreements were concluded with regard to
the enclaves. From 1976 to 1981, only periodic incidents have inter-
rupted the status quo at the enclaves. In February 1979, two bombs
exploded in Mel ilia. In May 1979, there was a bomb incident in Ceuta.
Moroccan patriotic organizations took credit for both of these.
During late 1979, Morocco made an attempt to stop the flow of
goods smuggled from Ceuta. In December 1980, then Spanish Prime
Minister Adolfo Suarez made visits to Ceuta and Mel ilia, which "Morocco
regarded ... as an act of extreme provocation", [Ref. 73].
On a much higher level, with the exception of some fishing disputes,
Spanish/Moroccan relations have been generally good since 1976. Joint
projects have included a joint Africa-to-Europe bridge commission,
arms exchange, fisheries assistance. grants, and cultural exchanges.
King Juan Carlos has visited Morocco, and King Hassan II has been in
Spain. Glorious statements of friendship have been made by the heads
of both nations. Still, on 1 June 1981, King Hassan II stated at a
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press conference: "Morocco must once and for all say the Sahara is
ours, including Sebta (Ceuta) and Millilia (Melilla), as it has always
been throughout history." [Ref. 74]
The Mediterranean has turned into a dividing line between the
Christians of Europe on the northern shores, and the Moslems of North
Africa and the Middle East on the southern and eastern shores. The
movement of the early Moslems across Africa, and into Iberia, was a
westward and northward surge, circumferentially around the Mediterranean.
The reconquest of Spain pushed the Moslems out of Western Europe, with
a southward movement. As if in reaction to the Spanish expulsion of
the Moors, on the opposite side of the Mediterranean, the Ottoman Turks
were making a northward and westward surge into Europe. With the fall
of the Ottoman Turkish empire during the 19th and early 20th centuries,
and the eventual postwar independence gained by each of the North Afri-
can countries, Islamic political resurgence seemed to be making another
westward movement across the southern Mediterranean shore.*
The Spaniards may see the rise in Arab nationalism and Arab economic
power gained through control of oil in the 20th century as a modern day
surge in which Spain may again, somehow, be swept up. The holding of
the enclaves could represent a last subconscious attempt on the part of
the Spaniards to symbolically avoid the beginnings of a new reconquest.
Coincidentally, the Spanish closing of the Gibraltar land frontier
to Spanish dayworkers in 1969, brought on the requirement for Moroccan
*The Moslem surges circumferentially around the Mediterranean, and
the eventual division of Christian and Moslem domains at the Strait of
Gibraltar and the Bosporus were described by Associate Professor 0. P.
Burke in lectures on the Mediterranean Security at the Naval Postgraduate
School in January 1982.
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dayworkers to fill those jobs in Gibraltar. Moroccans now work at





IV. SPAIN AND MOROCCO COMPARED
A. A STRATEGIC-GEOGRAPHIC COMPARISON
A brief, general comparison of Spain and Morocco emphasizes the
relative similarities and differences between the two countries. Some
of the major areas of each country are compared in a very general
fashion, i.e. geography, people, technology, mineral resources, and
industrial development. These areas combine to determine largely the
present and potential political -military significance of each country.
1 . Pure Geography
Both Spain and Morocco are located at the extreme corners of
their separate continents. Spain shares with Portugal the Iberian pen-
insula in the southwestern part of Europe. Morocco is located at the
far northwestern corner of North Africa.
Morocco is the westernmost Islamic country. It shares a mid-
Eastern culture with the other Arab States. Separation from the
center of their respective continents and cultural spheres has made
each country slightly different than the mainstream of European cul-
ture, or the mainstream of Arab culture. Spain always has been set
apart from Europe geographically by its peninsular location, and by
the Pyrenees. It continues this difference today as one of the last
major countries in Europe to join NATO and the EEC, and the associated
western democracies. Morocco is separated from the rest of Africa by
the Sahara, and from the rest of the north African countries by the
Atlas Mountains. It is far from Mecca, the center of Islam.
Ill

Peninsular Spain occupies a latitude band similar to that
stretching from Eugene, Oregon, to Monterey, California. With the
Canaries included, Spain extends to the same latitude as the spur of
Baja California (Point Eugenia).
Morocco and the Sahara occupy the same latitude band as that
stretching from Monterey to the southern tip of Baja California.
Spain and Morocco are, for the most part, situated between the Prime
Meridian, and ten degrees west longitude. Both countries have coasts
along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, although Spain's Atlantic
coastal continuity is broken by Portugal. Morocco's Mediterranean
coastal continuity is broken by Spain's enclaves.
Spain occupies an area of 195,000 square miles, and is, there-
fore, the second largest country in Europe after France (with 212,000
square miles). Spain is roughly in the shape of a square, with sides
measuring about 400 nautical miles. Six hundred miles off the southwest
coast, and 100 miles off the east coast, are the island groups of the
Canaries and the Balearics, respectively. Spain occupies five-sixths
of the Iberian Peninsula.
Morocco's area is 172,000 square miles. With the Sahara's
102,000 square miles, Morocco totals 274,000 square miles.* Morocco
*By comparison, California is 159,000 square miles. Texas is 267,000
square miles. To gain an appreciation for the size of Morocco, consult
Morocco, a Country Study
, p. ix. It depicts Morocco as comparable in
size and shape to the combined states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Vir-
ginia, and Kentucky, with some slight overlap into the neighboring states
(p. ix). A map of Morocco superimposed over a map of the eastern U.S.
shows the Strait of Gibraltar would be at Buffalo, and Horocco's south-
ern border at Nashville, Tennessee. When the Sahara is added, Morocco
stretches from Buffalo to Houston, Texas.
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is less than 90 nautical miles wide at the narrowest point, and 300
nautical miles at its widest point. Morocco is dominated by mountains,
and "has the most extensive river system in North Africa", [Ref. 75].
Most of the population lives in the valley lowlands of northwestern
Morocco. The Sahara is flat, thinly populated, and a desert frontier.
Morocco has a largely undefined border with Algeria in the east, which
is mostly mountains and desert. The Sahara borders on Mauritania and
Algeria.
2. People
Morocco proper has 20 million people, [Ref. 76]. It has a
population density of 155 people per square mile.* Spain has a popu-
lation of 38 million, and a population density of 192 people per square
mile, [Ref. 77], Morocco's birth rate is among the world's highest
with more than three percent rate of natural increase (greater than 40
births per thousand people). The population is expected to reach 23.5
million by 1985, [Ref. 78]. Spain's birthrate, by contrast, is moderate-
ly low, at between one and two percent natural increase (between 16 and
24 births per thousand population.) (The world average is 12 per 1,000.)
Over half of Morocco's population is under 20 years old, [Ref. 79].
Morocco has a literacy rate of less than 30 percent. By contrast,
Spain's literacy rate is greater than 90 percent. (World average is
65 percent, [Ref. 30].)
Spain's predominant religion is Roman Catholic. There are
about 26,000 Protestants, and 1,000 Jews in Spain, [Ref. 81].




Almost the entire populace of Morocco is Sunni Moslem.
Morocco has about 70,000 Christians, and about 30,000 Jews, [Ref. 82].
Castillian Spanish is the language in Spain, with Catalan spoken in
the northeast, Basque in the north, and Galician in the northwest.
Arabic is the official language in Morocco. There is a large Berber
minority as well, which speaks various dialects of Berberic, a lan-
guage of the Hamitic group.
Morocco's gross national product per capita is in the $400
to $1,200 range. In contrast, Spain's is in the $2,400 to $4,800 range.
These figures are for the urban population, as defined by each country.
(World average equals $2, 040, [Ref. 83].)
3. Technology
To obtain a comparison of Spain and Morocco technologically
,
a number of isolated areas have been used. There is little question
that Spain is much more technologically advanced than Morocco, but
comparative differences are helpful to see the magnitude. (See Figure
1.)
Although Figure 1 records somewhat isolated comparisons, in
each case Spain has at least a two-to-one technological advantage over
Morocco. It is interesting to note that Spain has a two-to-one popula-
tion advantage over Morocco as well. In the case of energy production,
Spain produces over 25 times more energy than Morocco.
4. Natural Resources
A lack of water has been a problem for Morocco. Even with its
river system, droughts have caused poor harvests during successive
years since the mid-1970's. Morocco has 96 square miles of inland water,
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Area of Comparison Year Spain Year Morocco
Roads 1977 146,000 km 1978 56,200 km
Paved 46,100 km 27,700 km
Railroads 1980 13,533 km 1978 1,756 km
Electrified 4,956 km 708 km
Cars (private) 1980 7,556,511 * 1979 413,043 **
Production Energy 1979 105,779 million kwh * 1979 4,105 million kwh
Cement 1979 26.13 million t * 1978 2.82 million t **
Sulphuric Acid 1979 2,950 thousand t * 1976 57 thousand t **
Figure 1. Isolated Technological Comparisons of Spain and Morocco.
Source: Paxton, John, Statesman's Year-Book 1981-82 ,




, pp. 1081, 1088.
115

Spain has over 2,000 square miles of inland water. In terms of soil
and land use, Spain has 122,000 square miles of agricultural land.*
Agricultural land in Morocco totals 78,000 square miles,** [Ref. 84].
Both countries are well -endowed with minerals. Morocco is
rich in minerals, and much of its potential remains untapped. Neither
country, however, has great quantities of oil or gas. Morocco has
started a program to encourage offshore oil exploration, which could
have a positive impact on its imported oil situation in the next decade
Morocco has one principal mineral—phosphate—of which it is the
world's leading exporter. Indeed, Morocco is third only to the United
States and the Soviet Union in terms of overall production. Morocco
has over 70 percent of the world's phosphate reserves. (See Appendix
A for a comparison of some of the significant minerals produced by
each country.)
5. Production
Agriculture is important to both countries. Although both
have been agriculturally strong, and able to feed their own people,
Morocco has been hurt by poor harvests, and its high population growth.
In 1980, less than 18 percent of the Spanish work forces were in the
agricultural sector, down from over 25 percent in 1970. Agriculture
contributed less than 10 percent of the GNP of Spain in 1980, while
*This includes arable land, land under permanent crops, and per-
manent meadows and pastures. An additional 59,000 square miles is
forest and woodland. Only 12,000 square miles of Spain's land is
classified as "other land", meaning of little or no agricultural value.
**The amount of forest and woodland in Morocco is 20,000 square
miles, and "other land" is 74,000 square miles.
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industry provided 36 percent. 3y contrast, "agriculture is the key to




[Ref. 35]. Over half of the working population is engaged in
agriculture. "In the past, Morocco has been largely self-sufficient
in food stuffs, but population growth is fast outpacing increases in
production." [Ref. 86] Morocco remains one of the leading citrus
exporters in the world. EEC membership for the major citrus producing
countries of Spain, Portugal and Greece may have cumulative bad effects
on Morocco's citrus exports.
Spain is continuing to grow in terms of industrial and manufac-
turing production. Spain's semi-finished and finished products indus-
tries are making varied comebacks after rapid growth in the 1960's,
followed by a leveling off in the 1970's, and the negative impact of
worldwide recession. "By 1930, the car industry was the country's
largest employer, and Spain had become the world's seventh largest pro-
ducer of cars. In 1981, output began to fall." [Ref. 37] Spain has
launched programs to revitalize its steel, shipbuilding, textile and
mining industries. In 1978, shipyards in Spain launched over one million
BRT of ships. The auto industry in 1978 built nearly 1.5 million
vehicles, one million of which were passenger cars. Spain's chemical
industry is growing.
Morocco has no comparable industrial production of finished
products. The country is making advances in the semi -finished product
area, especially in processing of phosphate rock into fertilizers, and
various acid concentrates, by local benefication and subsequent ferti-
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south of Mel ilia, has been on-again off-again for years. Oil refining,
textiles, metal industries, and a car industry all are in their early
stages.
B, MILITARY COMPARISON
Spain's 1979 GNP was $197 billion. Morocco's GNP, in contrast, was
$15.2 billion, less than one-tenth that of Spain. Spain spent $4.8
billion on defense in 1979. As a percent of the GNP, this is 2.4.
Morocco spent $676 million on defense in 1979, which is 4.4 percent of
GNP. Although Spain spent the same amount in pesetas on defense in
both 1979 and 1981 (337 billion pesetas), the 1981 figures for defense
spending equals $3.98 billion—down 17 percent from two years earlier
,
due to inflation . Whereas for Morocco, defense spending in dollars
has doubled
, to $1.2 billion. In local currency, dirham, the defense
spending increased by 23 percent. These figures do not include mili-
tary aid from the Saudis, nor from the U.S., which would increase the
overall amount of defense spending in Morocco, [Ref. 83].
Spain' t total armed forces are 342,000; Morocco's 120,000. Figures
for Morocco's total armed forces may be higher. Robin Knight states in
U.S. News and World Report that "the Army—one of Africa's most profes-
sional—has doubled in size to more than 150,000 in the last six years",
[Ref. 39]. Spain's Army has 255,000 men; Morocco's Army has 107,000
according to IISS. Spain has 330 tanks, with 100 more on order;
Morocco has 260 tanks with 108 more on order.
Spain's Navy has 49,000 men; Morocco's has 5,000. Spain nas 28
major combatants, including eight submarines, one aircraft carrier,
12 destroyers, and 16 frigates. Morocco has two frigates, and four
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landing ships. Morocco also has four Lazaga-class frigates with
Exocet on order. Spain has a marine force of 10,000 men, with 32
medium tanks.
Spain's Air Force has 38,000 men, and 193 combat aircraft.
Morocco's Air Force has 8,000 men, and between 75 and 90 combat air-
craft. Spain has 24 Mirage F-lBs, and between forty and 120 F-18s
on order. Morocco has 20 F-5Es on order, [Ref. 90].
Generally, Spain's military is characterized by bureaucracy,
whereas due to the Saharan conflict, Morocco's army is more combat
experienced. Both countries have excellent Air Forces. The Spanish
Navy has significant superiority in numbers and firepower over the
i-loroccan Navy.
With this comparison of the two countries complete, a description
of the following internal and external issues of each country puts the
enclave issue in lesser perspective relative to other major concerns.
C. SPAIN'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS
A variety of concerns in domestic Spain compete for the attention
of the government, and of the people. The threat posed by its
southern neighbor, and the importance of the NATO issue are only some
of the concerns of Spaniards, and they do not rank as major ones.
Certain issues have a much higher priority. Three issues seem clearly
to rank above the rest:
1. Unemployment and the economy;
2. Democratic Process and public administration reform;
3. Counter-terrorism and public safety.
120

Beyond those top three, it is difficult to rank the other issues,
but certainly the following would be of major concern:
1. The aftermath of the military trial of the February 1981
coup plotters;
2. NATO integration;
3. Military leaders and military missions. After 40 years of
military dictatorship, this issue will remain for some time
to come;
4. Regional autonomy, and the autonomy pacts. The Basques in
northern Spain, and the Catalans around Barcelona, are the
most autonomous, and also the most industrial, commercial,
and prosperous;
5. The Socialist's rise to power, and how successful they will
be at solving Spain's problems;
6. Energy: oil, nuclear, coal.
The priorities in the above listed issues obviously change depending
on the part of the country, or the segment of society concerned. The
Socialist victory, and the emergence of two moderate left and right wing
parties is likely to have little major impact on the steady course of
Spain's democratic growth. The military, and the discovery of coup
plots prior to the October 1982 election, remain a wild card to be
dealt with. Any major crises regarding these priority issues could
unduly shift Spanish national attention to that crisis issue. This
potentially would put Spain in a vulnerable situation in regard to the
enclaves. Any corresponding challenges by Morocco to the status of
the enclaves, either militarily, economically, or socially, could then
send shock waves through Spain, because of the military's close
association with the enclaves, [Ref. 91].
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D. MOROCCO'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS
The Riff Coast development and the return of the enclaves are not
a major area of concern for Morocco in late 1982. Morocco has many
major problems with which it must work. Some, unfortunately, are out
of Morocco's control. The three main areas of concern in Morocco are:
1. The war in the Sahara;
2. The effects of the world recession on the Moroccan economy;
3. Poor harvests.
These are followed by a myriad of other problems whose significance
varies from week to week, and from one sector of the population to
another. Generally, they are: variable phosphate prices and markets,
education, industrialization, urbanization and population control,
the succession of the King, political freedom and democracy, parlia-
mentary elections (which are scheduled in 1983), possible growth of
Moslem fundamentalist extremism, and student unrest.
The recession-related problems include: unemployment, the effects
of high imported oil prices and energy costs in general. "Despite [an]
array of economic and social problems, defense spending has remained
the priority of priorities", [Ref. 92]. The King has enjoyed the
support of the two left-wing parties, the Istiqlal and the UNFP ( Union
nationale de force populaires ), because of the war. It is the war
which stands in the way of accomplishing many of the tasks which Morocco
so desperately needs to do. Although many people in Morocco look on
a negotiated settlement in the Sahara as unacceptable if it includes
territorial concessions, some type of settlement seems to be the only
way to allow the Moroccan Government to redirect its full efforts to
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its other problem areas. While the country is tied up in the Sahara,
there is little time to spend on the enclave issue. It is neither the
intent nor the desire to do more than state that the war which began
in 1975-76 is the major concern in Morocco, and little can be accom-
plished in other areas because of the current stalemate situation.
The likelihood of a conflict between the two countries over these
small pieces of territory seems remote in late 1982. There are three
main reasons for this:
1. Spain's demonstration of resolve with regard to staying in
the enclaves;
2. King Hassan's moderating influence in Morocco;
3. Above all, Morocco's stalemated war in the Sahara against the
Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al
Hamra and Rio de Oro).
There are other reasons as well, but they likely play lesser or
complimentary roles to the above. The degree to which the two countries
have cooperative ventures and mutually beneficial compromises largely
determines the potential for conflict, or its avoidance, especially
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Map 13. Morocco as Shown on Official Tourist Brochure. (Note all





V. SPAIN, MOROCCO AND THE SUPERPOWERS
A. INTERACTION BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO
It is very difficult to assess effectively the relations between
Spain and Morocco. When asked by the author of this thesis in Septem-
ber 1982, U.S. Embassy officials in both Rabat and Madrid indicated
that there are no major areas of cooperation between Spain and Morocco.
This response was followed by statements that the Kings of the two
countries are close personal friends, visit each other, and are often
on the telephone discussing mutual problems. This high level contact
demonstrates in principle the importance that each monarch places on
his close neighbor across the Strait.
The areas of tension and competition between the two countries are
more easily isolated than the areas of cooperation. Five major points
of tension or competition are: fishing rights and disputes, the enclaves,
Spain's unclear political stand regarding the Sahara conflict and the
Polisario, off-shore oil potential between the Canaries and the coast
of Morocco, and competition for European markets, especially in the
citrus trade. Some of these are discussed further below.
In an attempt to come up with areas of cooperation, the following
have been isolated: trade, tourist transit, possibly land transit of
people and goods to Western Europe, high level political cooperation,
some fishing agreements, and future Strait of Gibraltar bridge plans.
Many of these cooperative ventures are more compromises or tradeoffs




The Moroccan News Summary
,
published bi-monthly by the Embassy
of Morocco in Washington, D.C., usually has a section on "Relations
between Spain and Morocco." One gets the impression that most of
the benefits from the relations are in Morocco's favor. The Spanish
try to hold onto what they have. A quote from the Koran seems to
fit Morocco's position on Spanish-Moroccan relations: "Act in a
way that will lead your enemy to consider you as a friend."
Fishing, as noted above, is both a source of tension between the
two countries, and a source of collaboration. The Spanish fishing
fleet is large, and its expertise is eagerly sought by the Moroccans.
Morocco considers Spanish fishing technology a fair exchange, for it
is the rich seafood resources off of the Moroccan Atlantic coast
which are among those the Spaniards traditionally have exploited.
These fishing grounds correspond with the Gibraltar Strait-Canary
Islands axis of Spain, and are around the Canary Islands themselves.
The fact that the Canaries are located 50 miles off the Moroccan coast
contributes to the tensions associated with the fishing rights, especial
ly in light of the establishment of a 200 mile economic zone by the
Moroccans. The Canaries represent a rather large hole in that economic
zone. Fishing cooperation is, therefore, blocked to a large extent
by fishing disputes between the two countries, and the conflict of
interests associated with them. As noted below, however, there has
been a large increase in Spanish seafood imports from Morocco.
The desire to reach a fishing settlement apparently has carried
over into the citrus competition between the two countries. A
Moroccan-Spanish fishing agreement in 1979 allegedly included a
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secret clause regarding overland transit of Moroccan citrus fruit via
Spain to the rest of Europe, [Ref. 93]. It apparently was secret
because such an agreement no doubt undercuts Spain's own citrus export
market. There have been conflicting reports regarding the volume of
such transit of Moroccan goods to Europe through Spain. Spain's
eventual entry into the EEC will hurt the Moroccan citrus trade when
the Spanish citrus industry gains EEC trade preference.
Conflict of interests between the two countries continues
with regard to the enclaves. As mentioned previously, while Hassan is
in power, this likely will remain a diplomatic debate unless there is
a major humiliating turn in the Sahara conflict. If there is a failure,
or even an eventual successful settlement in the Sahara, the enclaves
are the next likely Moroccan target. The post-independence advance of
Morocco has been mainly at the cost of Spain.
It was in this (decolonization) context that Morocco regained
its territories after successive negotiations--the northern zone
in 1956 from Spain; Tangiers in 1956 from the 12 administrative
powers; Tarfaya in 1958 from Spain; Ifni in 1969, again from Spain;
and finally (14 November 1975) the Sahara provinces by a tripartite
agreement in Madrid. [Ref. 94]
Cooperation between the two countries does exist. One of the major
areas is trade. The balance of trade between the two countries continues
to illustrate the normal interaction between Spain and Morocco. It is
in Spain's favor, although the advantage to Spain has decreased over
the last five years. In 1981, Spain exported to Morocco 1.6 times
as much as it imported. Imports were $136 million; exports were $303
million.* Although these figures show a balance of trade in Spain's
'The 1981 exchange rate was 94.15 pesetas/$l
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favor, the margin is down from five years earlier v/hen in 1977 Spain
had a 2.36:1 advantage, [Ref. 95]. Spain supplies more of Morocco's
imports than any other country except France. Between 1977 and 1931,
the value of Spanish imports from Morocco nearly doubled with one of
the major areas of increase being in seafood. The value of Moroccan-
supplied seafood to Spain increased tenfold from 1977 to 1981. But
the largest single commodity which Spain imports from Morocco is
phosphates. In 1981, phosphates accounted for over three-quarters of
the value of Spanish imports from Morocco. The major products Spain
supplies to Morocco include iron and steel, vegetable oil and auto-
mobiles. Percentages for these commodities are 20 percent, 12 percent,
and four percent, respectively. Areas of cooperation between the two
countries also include the phosphate mine at Bu Craa in the Sahara,
which is 65 percent Moroccan and 35 percent Spanish-owned.
Many tourists bound for Morocco arrive via Spain—one factor from
which both countries benefit. This is especially critical for Morocco
if it is to continue to attract tourists from the rest of Europe,
many of whom drive to Morocco. As noted previously, the number of
Moroccan guest workers in European countries, especially in France,
has increased greatly since 1977, ar.d many transit to and from Europe
via Spain.
Politically, one of the more sensitive issues between Spain and
Morocco has been the Spanish policy toward the Sahara conflict. The
Spanish Government has been neither solidly for nor against the
Moroccan position in the Sahara. Spanish policy has ranged from
support of Morocco to defacto recognition of the Pol i sari o. There
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have been various meetings and dealings between the Spanish Government
and the Polisario to gain the release of Spanish fishermen kidnapped
by Polisario guerillas. The Africa Contemporary Record, 1979-80 states
that "the main conflict between the two countries concerns Spain's
continuing, and agonizing, reappraisal of its attitude to the Sahara",
[Ref. 96]. Regarding overall political orientation, however, H. P.
Klepak observes:
Spain is comfortable with a conservative, monarchical, pro-
Western government in Rabat. King Hassan is clearly comfortable
with a centrist, monarchical, pro-Western government in Madrid.
[Ref. 97]
The interest of the Spanish Army in Melilla and Ceuta are such that
any challenges in the enclaves likely will have reverberations through-
out Spain.
Possibly one of the most interesting and unique areas in the dis-
cussion of relations between the two is in regard to a bridge or tunnel
to link the two countries and their continents. This has received
renewed publicity in 1981-82. The Moroccan News Summary dated March 1982
contained a lengthy article concerning the project. One of the comments
was:
The construction of such a link would bring great changes to
both Spain and Morocco on a political and geopolitical level, as
it would to all its users. Morocco would become a part of Europe,
and the link would place Morocco, which exports a large amount of
fruit and agricultural produce by sea, in direct contact with its
clients. [Ref. 98].
The project is being worked on with technical assistance from the
French and Japanese. The Japanese tunnel at Seikan will be 33 miles
long when completed. That is approximately the length of the proposed
Gibraltar Strait tunnel. Planning still is in the yery early stage.
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Due to the extreme depth of the Strait, the tunnel is expected to be
at the shallowest point, not the narrowest point. Therefore, it prob-
ably will go from just east of Tangier, to just west of Tarifa. The
project, if started, is not expected to be completed until the end of
the century. It is not a new idea. A 1964 article in the Economist
says that the Spaniards were looking at building such a project on and
off since 1369. Groups from Spain, Morocco, France, and Britain were
talking about the project in the early 1960's. Capital for the con-
struction of such a project always has been the problem, [Ref. 99].
Should the project ever be completed, it is likely that Morocco would
stand to gain the most from it. How much support Spain is willing to
put into such a project is unknown, but probably the present talk is
little more than lip service. If such a tunnel were to be completed
in the location suggested, Ceuta probably would lose much of its
attractiveness as an easy entry into Morocco.
The tunnel project exemplifies Spanish-Moroccan relations in
general. The project is a good idea on paper. Similarly, there are
many good intentions for overall improved relations between the two
countries. Both sides would like to see a more mutually beneficial
association. Every plan that is developed seems to be more to the
benefit of Morocco than to Spain. That is, Spain is of more value to
Morocco than Morocco is to Spain. In each case, the agreements seem
to be a Spanish concession to retain what Spain already has, rather
than of mutual benefit to both parties. As in the case of the bridge,
discussions on stronger ties and cooperation will continue, but their
results are not expected to come until far in the future.
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B. THE UNITED STATES' INTERESTS IN THE REGION
Regional stability and maintenance of good relations with the
countries on both sides of the Strait is obviously the goal of United
States foreign policy in the region. Spain continues to make great
strides as it integrates itself into the Western mainstream after
years of isolation. Spain now is in NATO, and it is unlikely that
the newly-elected Socialist Government will call for a referendum
until late 1983, or early 1934, while it concentrates on other more
pressing internal problems. Spain and the U.S. signed another bi-
lateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1982 which is scheduled
to remain in effect until 1987.
United States relations with Morocco have become increasingly
friendly under the Reagan administration. The arms transfers from
the U.S. to Morocco are for two purposes according to congressional
testimony:
1. The basic purpose of providing them with the equipment is
to encourage a negotiation (on the Sahara issue) wnich we
hope will facilitate a political solution of the conflict.
2. The second is . . . that the equipment in its own right
has military utility in strengthening the armed forces.
[Ref. 100].
The debate as to whether this will be successful or not is heated.
One aspect of the debate which surfaced was Spain's position on U.S.
arms transfers to Morocco. The question was asked of Harold H.
Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
whether the Spanish Government supported the U.S. arms package to
Morocco. The response was:
Although we discussed the sale with the Spanish, we neither
requested nor were given their endorsement. Nevertheless, the
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Spanish expressed their hope that the sale would contribute to
a peaceful solution to the dispute. [Ref. 101].
The Spanish Ambassador to the United States sent a letter to the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
dated 10 March 1980. Two carefully-worded sentences possibly hold a
key to the true Spanish position on more arms sales to Morocco:
With the aim of promoting a negotiated settlement from a
position of neutrality, the policy of the Spanish Government
has been to maintain an embargo on arms to the countries in-
volved in the conflict. Consequently, the Spanish Government
has never expressed the opinion that arms sales could contri-
bute to a peaceful solution of the conflict"! [Ref. 102J. Emphasis added,
Although this is a negative statement, the implication may be that
after a settlement in the Sahara, a better-armed, combat-experienced
Moroccan military could turn its enlarged military force on the next
irredentist claims—the Spanish enclaves. Although unlikely under
Hassan, the scenario is not farfetched under a less moderate future
regime. The Ambassador's statement in the context of the "Threat
from the South" syndrome certainly makes Spain appear uneasy with the
closer U.S. -Moroccan relationship. Generally there is a lack of
institutional relationships between the United States and Morocco.
This could prove to be detrimental to United States interests in the
region after King Hassan.*
*In many ways United States support to Morocco and King Hassan is
similar to that given to Iran and the Shah. Both the King and the Shah
declared themselves pro-Western. The two situations each have in common
a similar lack of institutional support, and an emphasis on support of
a man vice a country. In 1982, King Hassan is synonymous with Morocco
and vice versa. Without trying to manipulate internal politics, U.S.
foreign policymakers should expand support of Morocco beyond the areas




C. SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE REGION
The Soviet Union attempted at various levels to discourage the
accession of Spain into NATO. This effort was unsuccessful. After
Spain joined NATO, official correspondence from the Soviet Foreign
Minister stated that the good relations between Spain and the Soviet
Union would continue in spite of the accession. It is likely that as
Spain is integrated into NATO, Soviet interest and attempts to influ-
ence developments in Spain will be only within the overall framework
of relations between East and West, [Ref. 103].
Relations between the Soviet Union and Morocco have been of a
curious nature. King Hassan II clearly has indicated his pro-Western
stance. The Soviets remain interested in Morocco for a variety of
reasons. As recently as ten years ago in 1973, military links between
the Soviet Union and Morocco were in place to facilitate the transport
of 2,000 to 3,000 Moroccan troops aboard Soviet naval ships for the
reinforcement of Syria in the six months prior to the October 1973
Middle East war. This was the first time foreign troops had been trans-
ported aboard Soviet ships outside Europe. Many things in Morocco
have changed since 1973, but the fact that such connections existed
to execute the operation is an indication of Soviet willingness to
cooperate militarily with Morocco.
The Polisario guerillas are using Soviet weapons in the Sahara.
This fact has threatened to sour Soviet-Moroccan relations. The Soviets
claim the arms come from the Libyans, and the Algerians, and that the
Soviets have no control over these two countries. The Moroccan Govern-
ment has indicated, nevertheless, that it expects the Soviets to bring
pressure to bear over the use of their weapons against Morocco.
133

Soviet press statements linking the U.S. with Morocco's struggle
against the Polisario appear from time to time, however, the Soviets
generally have not taken a strong stand on either side of the issue.
This seems to be an indication of either lack of interest, a desire
not to sour Soviet economic relations with Morocco, or a lack of con-
fidence in the capabilities of the Polisario to win the territory.
The Soviets demonstrated an ability to reverse rapidly their support
in the Somolia-Ethiopia conflict. Such a shift could occur based on
opportunities in the case of support to one of the sides in the Sahara
conflict. With King Hassan in power, a shift toward Morocco would not
be likely. With a successive Moroccan regime of lesser pro-Western
stance, this type of scenario is not so outlandish. Morocco, without
a doubt, would be a prize to the Soviets.*
*Many Third World countries make rhetorical statements about
turning to the Soviets for aid. A discussion between an American
academic and a Moroccan officer illustrates a perception that Soviet
military aid would come easily. The discussion occurred in late
1982 between a Naval Postgraduate School professor, lecturing at
the U.S. Air War College, and a Moroccan military officer in atten-
dance. The topic of the forum was U.S. arms transfer policies.
The Moroccan officer made the statement that the U.S. constantly
was making it too difficult to get arms by placing so many restric-
tions, and allowing so much debate prior to the actual transfer.
He contrasted this to the Soviet position, and how easy it was to
get such support from them. The professor pointed out that there
were certain other requirements that the Soviets place on countries
after their transfers. The Moroccans had received Soviet arms,
including aircraft, during the late 1950's and early 1960's, and
it is possible that there is a lingering impression that those
transfers were much freer than the present ones which appear to be
under constant close scrutiny by Congress. [Personal interview
with Professor Edward J. Laurence, Assistant Professor, Department




In his article on the Soviet realignment in the Horn of Africa,
Steven David concluded:
Since the Soviets had the will and capability to meet these
very real security needs while the United States did not, it is
not surprising that the Soviets emerged as triumphant as they did.
... In a conflict such as exists in the Horn (and in many other
places throughout the Third World), the introduction of this
weaponry and especially of Soviet bloc troops, is enough to
decisively tip the balance in the Soviet client's favor. The
lesson which emerges is clear: if vour country faces a security
threat, seek out the Soviets for assistance . [Ref. 104]. Emphasis added,
The Soviets appear to be cautious regarding their relations with
Morocco. Painfully aware of their failure in Egypt at the other open-
ocean outlet to the Mediterranean, they seem to be patiently waiting
and working on a new tack, one that has been observed elsewhere.
Professor Richard Pipes states:
The Soviet economic arsenal is not rich enough to serve as a
major weapon of Soviet global strategy. . . . Soviet economic
leverage is exercised mainly through military and economic assist-
ance, carefully doled out to countries judged to be of strategic
importance. Aid of this kind creates all kinds of dependencies,
including the willingness of the recipient to host Communist ad-
ministrative personnel. It is very instructive to analyze statistics
of Soviet economic assistance to Third World countries because the
figures give a good insight into the relative importance that Moscow
attaches to them. On a per-capita basis, among the greatest bene-
ficiaries of Soviet aid since 1954 have been South Yemen and Afghan-
istan. More recently, the USSR and its clients have poured vast
sums of money into Turkey, a member of NATO, and Morocco. Signifi-
cant increases in Soviet assistance usually are reliable indicators
of Soviet strategic interests in a given area: judging by recent
aid patterns, the Mediterranean enjoys yery high priority in its
mina. [Ref. 105].
In March 1978, Morocco signed what was called "The Contract of tne
Century" with the Soviet Union. The Soviets are to develop the
Meskala phosphate deposit. The Moroccans have guaranteed delivery
of enriched phosphate for some 30 years. The contract was referred to
by the QMS Market Intelligence Report as "the largest single Soviet
135

credit to a developing country", [Ref. 106]. The value of the contract
has been reported as two to 2.7 billion dollars. The congressional
testimony on arms transfers to Morocco and North Africa had the trans-
action as high as $30 billion.
The Meskala deposit in Morocco has not been shown to be a rich one.
Approximately 100 geologists from the Soviet Union have been in Morocco
surveying the area. The contract is to include the mining equipment
and technology at the Meskala site, the railroad line to the coast,
and a port facility. The phosphates from the mine, and the intermediates
(TSP) will be sent to the Soviet Union (ten million tons of TSP con-
centrate per year). At 1982 prices, it would take about 16 years for
the Soviets to get back their investment. At its current rate of
development, the mine is not likely to start producing until the 1990' s.
Production on the contract is planned to go into the first decades
of the next century, [Ref. 107], This is an excellent example of the
long term agreements spoken of by Robert Donaldson:
Just as the Soviet leaders learned not to rely on ideology
to forge ties in the Third World, so they have become more sophis-
ticated about economic aid. In recent years, the speculative aid
projects Khrushchev favored have been abandoned, and Soviet aid
and trade agreements are now cast in a longer range framework ,
institutionalized through bilateral economic commissions, and
allowing for greater integration with Soviet and East European
plans for development. [Ref. 108]. Emphasis added.
This appears to be the case with Soviet investment and aid to Morocco
for the mutual benefit of both countries.
There are two ways of looking at the Soviet phosphate deal. Over
the long term, the Soviets will keep close economic ties with geo-
strategically located Morocco, even though it is a Western-oriented state.
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Morocco's nearly 1,000 mile Atlantic coastline is astride the Persian
Gulf/Cape of Good Hope/North Europe oil shipping lanes, and the South
Africa/North Europe coal shipping lanes. If the Soviets expect a
potential falling out with the West, or an overthrow of King Hassan,
the large contract on Moroccan phosphate resources could be an excel-
lent basis for the friendship. Morocco would be important to the
Soviet Union under such circumstances.
Alternatively, increased use of phosphate fertilizer is one of
the ways for the Soviets to increase their disastrously poor agricul-
tural productivity. Currently, Soviet domestic phosphates are in
sufficient quantities. The need for this resource will continue, and
the Soviets realize that the main reserves are in Morocco. The
Soviets therefore could simply be planning for the future as a
shortfall seems likely within the first two decades of the next century.
D. SUMMARY.
In summary, the situation appears to be the following between
Spain, Morocco and the Superpowers. The United States' interest in
Morocco needs to be strengthened institutionally to plan for long
term regional stability. The USSR appears to be investing cautiously,
and building long term ties to take advantage of a possible post-
Hassan shift should Morocco decide to take a less pro-Western stance.
Spain, unfortunately, does not appear to benefit substantially from
better relations with Morocco. The Spanish apparently continue to
see many of Morocco's future gains to continue to be at Spanish
expense, especially regarding fishing, the enclaves, and the tunnel.
Major emphasis on better Spanish-Moroccan relations will, therefore,
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continue to be Moroccan initiatives using the enclaves issue and
Atlantic fishing rights as leverage. Spain's interests economically
remain directed to the north. Spanish emphasis defensively will
remain, at least partially, directed to the south because of the
Canaries and the enclaves. A pro-Soviet Morocco would be in the best
interests of neither Spain nor the United States. Therefore, the
Spanish must pursue more actively policies that not only are in their
own interest, but also in the interest of long term stability within
a problem-ridden and increasingly military-oriented Morocco.
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VI. WORLD ENCLAVES: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON
In the interest of gaining insight into some of the special circum-
stances of strategic enclaves, a framework is developed below for
systematic analysis and comparison of some of the world's enclaves
—
past and present. There are similarities and differences between the
enclaves of the past and those of today.
Random House Dictionary of the English Language , 1979, defines an
"enclave" as "a country, or especially, an outlying portion of a
country, entirely or mostly surrounded by the territory of another
country". Various other sources restrict the definition to "a portion
of a country which is separated from the main part and surrounded by
politically alien territory", Webster's New World Dictionary . The
term enclave seems to apply in a much broader sense to a number of
territories or disputed pieces of land around the world.
Modern technology, International Law, and Law of the Sea have given
new significance to small pieces of land which suddenly define large
tracts of territorial ocean and seabed. Furthermore, as the major
countrtes of the world desire to control the seas and trade to their
advantage, small pieces of territory at certain strategic locations
facilitate this.
It is in the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica that "enclave" is
generally used in a looser sense to describe a "colony or other ter-
ritory of a state which, while possessing a seaboard, is entirely
surrounded landward by the possession of some other power", [Ref. 109].
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This general loose sense, modified further by new geo-strategic,
international law, territorial sea notions, and modern technological
dimensions, is how the term is broadly used here. This broader defini-
tion has been given the name "semi -enclave". Many other terms have
been separated by G. W. S. Robinson in the Annals of the Association
of American Geography , 1959, including "Normal, Pene-, Quasi-, Virtual,
and Temporary". He uses the term in the other perspective, i.e.,
"exclave", [Ref. 110].
In the case of the island enclaves, which is the category of at
least two of the three minor places of Spanish sovereignty, the concept
of "proximity" to the foreign country, and to the mother country, plays
a part. Also the "territorial waters" aspect of the Law of the Sea
convention has a role in the discussion. The problems associated with
island enclaves in general takes on significant naval implications,
especially with regard to resources, commerce, and trade.
By taking the broader definition, which fits more the case of
Spain's North African enclaves at the narrow maritime strait or
chokepoint, the major problems associated with fully encircled
enclaves, i.e., the "problem of access" to the enclave from the mother
country, becomes less important. It does, however, remain a factor
because of the "territorial waters" concept. The problem of access
receives full treatment in F. E. Krenz' International Enclaves and
Rights of Passage (Geneva, 1961),* [Ref. 111].
*Krenz uses historical analogy as it applies to fully encircled
enclaves of the present and recent past. Krenz says that the question
has not been examined in depth until his work. "Is passage considered
to be a right in the absence of treaties?" He examines this question
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Krenz' conclusions do not fully apply to the Spanish enclaves
situation, therefore his discussion of the problem of access is dealt
with only peripherally. Much of the Krenz analysis is helpful as
an alternate to the independent analytical framework developed here.
The goal is to classify enclaves systematically and logically for
comparison. This is the type of framework used to gather and inter-
pret available information on the Spanish enclaves, and other enclaves.
The purpose of the framework is to determine if analogous situations
are, or are not relevant to one another. The analysis also attempts
to determine some useful pattern that suggests future problem areas,
and any practical payoffs as a guide for U.S. foreign policy. The
analysis of the present situations displays the degree of actual
existing tensions, and helps to show whether a balance of strength
exists, physically or psychologically, with regard to the opposing sides
A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLASSIFICATION
Before the framework was devised, over 30 enclaves, potential
enclaves, or analogous situations were listed. Appendix B includes
both enclave situations and some analogous non-enclave situations.
Some of these non-enclave situations are interesting, because they
illustrate similar territorial questions. In a very abbreviated form,
the framework appears as follows:
in the context of International Law, custom, and precedence, West
Berlin and the problem of access is discussed, but only to a limited
extent, with no conclusions drawn (pp. 23-4). He omits Berlin from
his study for various reasons. Unfortunately, the building of the
Wall, and the printing of his book, occurred in the same year. No





a. Is there superpower interest?
b. Is the enclave geo-strategically located?
c. Are there significant special circumstances?
d. What is the general state of relations between the mother





d. Economic and resource considerations;
e. Miscellaneous additional details.
The framework above was devised to look systematically at the most
important data. The objective is to look at the most decisive character-
istics regarding individual enclaves. The following four preliminary
questions tend to establish the decisive characteristics:
First, is there superpower interest? The interest could be in the
enclave itself, or a special relationship or concern with either the
mother country, or the foreign or enclaving country. The presence of
such interest aids in the definition of the overall international
significance on the enclave in question.
Secondly, is the enclave geographically strategic? Such strategic
importance can be in terms of position, e.g., Gibraltar and Ceuta at
a chokepoint, or in terms of strategic resources, e.g., certain island
enclaves in the Persian Gulf.
Thirdly, are there significant special circumstances? Long overland
or over-water distances can be especially significant, e.g., the past
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situation of East and West Pakistan divided by India; the distance
between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin; or long
ocean distances, in the cases of the Falklands, Hong Kong, and Macao.
Although not an enclave in a strict sense, the Falklands are a case
of disputed territory much closer to the foreign country, Argentina,
than to the mother country, Britain. When coupled with territorial
waters, economic zones, continental shelf rights, and Law of the Seas
considerations, this makes the Falklands similar to other enclaves,
if the word is used in the broadest sense that appears applicable in
the late 20th century. These considerations of distance from the
mother country would normally be included in geographic considerations,
and they significantly can affect psychological perceptions of the
states involved, or the dependency of the enclave on the foreign state.
In addition, Hong Kong and Macao, for example, have other significant
circumstances that alter their cases. An extreme dependence on the
foreign country by the enclave would be significant also.
Fourthly, define the mother country and the foreign or enclaving
country, and explain the general state of relations between the two.
In the case of Greece and Turkey, where there is significant animosity,
small problems can be blown out of proportion. In the case of Franca
and Britain, small problems likely are to be overlooked in the interest
of larger cooperation. In the case of Argentina and Britain, however,
relations seemed to be good with the exception of the Falklands/Malvinas
dispute. The question of the general state of relations must be put
in the context of other events and considerations as well. Internal
problems, alliance and bloc associations, economics, and type and
stability of government are a few of these other considerations.
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After the above preliminary questions are answered, the Data portion
of the framework may supply other significant inputs. The first set of
hard data concerns Geographical Considerations which include:
1. Location, as amplifying data for the geo-strategic question
above
;
2. Proximity, i.e., what is the distance of the enclave from the
mother country, and from the foreign country?;
3. Contiguity, i.e., is the enclave contiguous, or is it an island?;
4. Area in square miles.
The second set of data in regard to Demographic and Ethnic Consider-
ations includes:





6. Current and former relations with the mother country, and with
the enclaving country. Generally any distinct ancestral,
cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics of the
enclave are developed in this category.
The third set of data, Historical /Political /Military Considerations
includes:
1. Date of acquisition of the enclave by the mother country;
2. Length of time enclave has been part of the mother country,
and how long, if ever, the territory had been part of the
enclaving country;
3. How much conflict has there been, and when was the last major
conflict?;
4. The general nature of relations over the issue of the enclave,




5. What are the present defenses which the mother country has in
place on the enclave, especially in numbers of troops and
significant arms?
The fourth and final set of data has to do with Economic and
Resource Considerations. This set includes:
1. What is the basic makeup of the economy and trade of the enclave?
Is it self-supporting?;
2. What are the major industries, and are there any significant
resources?;
3. What is the commercial advantage of the enclave to the mother
country, and to the enclaving country?;
4. What percent GNP of the mother country does the enclave supply?;
5. What are the import/export figures between the enclave and the
mother country, and the enclaving country?
Miscellaneous additional details may be added, such as the presence
of a free-port, a rapid decline in population, or significant information
regarding health or education in the enclave. Although the framework is
fairly simplistic, it sets out the decisive points of consideration, but
still allows room for exceptional circumstances. The framework easily
can be used to classify and compare. Furthermore, it serves as a basis
for discussing systematically the similarities and differences of various
enclaves.
B. SAMPLE
In many ways, the previous chapters have been a presentation of the
Spanish enclaves in North Africa, and have supplied much of the available
information suggested in this framework. Some of the information is
obscure, conflicting, or difficult to find. Clearly, some of the items
in the framework apply more to some situations than to others. Also,
some items are more significant in some situations than in others.
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The Canary Islands are used for a brief, illustrative example of the
application of the framework.
There is no major superpower interest in the Canaries, but in 1969
the Soviets negotiated for commercial shipping contracts which were
granted by Franco. The U.S. and the West realize the geo-strategic
significance of the Canaries as they sit astride the Persian Gulf/Cape
of Good Hope/Northern European petroleum route, and the South Africa/
Northern European coal shipping route. Special circumstances may be
considered to be the close proximity of the Canary Islands to Morocco
(55 miles), and the relative distance from Spain (650 miles). Rela-
tions between Spain and Morocco have been good in general, although
differences do exist over certain territories and fishing rights.
Proximity is discussed above, and the impact of this proximity
can affect territorial waters as well as economic zone claims and
violations. The area of the Canaries is 2,800 square miles, and the
population is 1.4 million—almost entirely Spanish. Spanish is the
language spoken, and Roman Catholicism is the major religion professed,
Relations are closer with Spain than with Morocco, but autonomy,
separatism, and independence movements exist.
The Canaries were acquired in 1402 by Spain. There is no indica-
tion that they ever belonged to Morocco. Spain has occupied the islands
for 580 years. Conflict has centered around fishing boat seizures
and territorial waters/economic zone violations, with the last major
incidents in 1980. Debate regarding the Canaries was brought up
before the 0AU in the late 1970's. Spain maintains a 16,000
man garrison on the islands, as well as naval and air force presence,
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and a separate joint command. Economy is primarily tourism and fishing.
Trade is more with Spain and northern Europe than with Morocco. An
independence movement could be a future factor.
C. WORLD ENCLAVES COMPARED
There are some major groupings of enclaves, or other areas of poten-
tial territorial dispute, that share significant similarities. In some
cases, these can be considered "enclaves" only in the broadest sense.*
Moroccan arguments over the Spanish enclaves claim geography as a
reason why the enclaves should not be Spanish. If this were valid,
then any place where a separated territory of one country is closer to
another country would be in question. If that were the case, Alaska
should be a part of Canada or Russia, rather than the United States.
Greenland should be a part of Canada, Iceland, or Britain, rather than
under Danish sovereignty.
There are many geographical curiosities around the world which are
much more unusual than the Spanish enclaves. Alaska's Alexander Archi-
pelago, the Channel Islands off of France, and Denmark's Bornholm Island
(which is closer to Sweden and East Germany than to the Danish mainland)
are examples of other geographical and political boundaries wnich are
somewhat anomalous. Some of these are included in Appendix B as examples
of the way in which geography is only one territorial consideration.
The following groupings include some examples from the Appendix for
illustration only, and do not imply that they are enclaves or disputed
territories.
*Turkey is an ethnically and geographically Asiatic enclave of Europe.




Those that are geographically in a strategic location include West
Berlin, the Canaries, Ceuta, Faeroes, Gibraltar, Guantanamo, and
Turkey. Those that had more geo-strategic significance for their area
at a time in the past include Bomholm, Cyprus, Memel , Danzig, and Zara.
Superpower interest or rivalry is high in the following areas: Berlin,
Guantanamo, Israel, and Turkey. Of these two major groups, Berlin is
the only one included in each, and, significantly, it has seen super-
power confrontation.
A further group may be those that have significant special circum-
stances. For various reasons, these include Berlin, Canaries, Ceuta/
Mel ilia, Cyprus, Falklands, Faeroes, Gibraltar, Guantanamo, Hong Kong,
Israel, and Macao. Those enclaves where there is significant under-
lying hostility between the mother country and the enclaving country
include: Tierra del Fuego, Berlin (Soviet presence), Cyprus, Greek
Islands off of Turkey, Guantanamo, Israel, Quemoy/Matsu, and Turkey
in Europe. Past enclaves in this category include: Mernel /Danzig and
East Pakistan. It is interesting to notice that the Falklands, the
Faeroes, and Gibraltar do not fall into this category, but conflict
has occurred without this association. These enclaves serve as
examples of instances where generally good relations and economic
ties have not overcome certain events and circumstances. The Spanish
enclaves could fit into this category.
Size and population only seem to play a contributory role if they
act in concert with other considerations; in other words, if they
affect perceptions regarding an enclave, as does distance. But tne
factors that draw attention seem to be geo-strategic position, resources,
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and significant trade. The ethnic factor is important when there exists
an underprivil edged or persecuted majority, or minority. Examples of
cases where ethnic factors exist include Cyprus, Israel, Goa, Northern
Ireland, East Pakistan, Turkey in Europe, and potentially Walvis Bay
in Namibia.
In each of the instances noted above, the historical and political
aspects tend to make the emotions play a more significant part. Such
historical and political aspects can, therefore, be an "unknown" factor
in a given situation, because of the difficulty of measuring the impact
of emotions. It can turn a seemingly stable and possibly even a mutually
beneficial situation into just the opposite, e.g., Goa. Some residents
of the Spanish enclaves have suggested this would happen in the enclaves
if Ceuta and Mel ilia were turned over to Morocco. The infrastructure
of the cities and ports, and the economies would continue to function
efficiently for less than five years. After that time, the cities would
begin to decline in efficiency, as did Tangier after it was turned over
to Morocco by the twelve administrative powers.
Economic factors are significant when the enclave is an outlet for
goods from the foreign country. Hong Kong, Macao, Goa (past), and
Singapore (past) are examples of such a situation. Resources can be
divided into two different areas: land and sea. Herein lies a signi-
ficant factor for potential future conflict regarding enclaves. This
also plays a significant part in explaining why there can be a broader
definition for the term enclave in the world today. Land resources
have played a part in Goa (manganese). The labor resources of China




Sea resources traditionally have been associated with fish. Fish-
ing boundaries, economic zones, and territorial waters all contribute
to expanding the enclave problem. The Law of the Sea [Ref. 112]
proposals would make, for example, a ten square mile rock or tip of
land into a three, 12, 50, or 200 mile radius restricted zone. Draw-
ing a 50 mile circle or zone around a country vastly increases the
territory of either the enclave or the foreign country. This makes the
situation similar to the territorial disputes of the past. Rights of
ocean passage and usage become an international problem similar to the
rights of land passage in the past. Leigh S. Ratiner, in Foreign
Affairs , uses the hypothetical example of Spain's noncompliance in the
Law of the Seas regarding passage of ships through the Strait of
Gibraltar, [Ref. 113]. The same can be said of Moroccan noncompliance
in the Law of the Sea over the same strait.
Modern technology allows developed countries to take advantage of
resources on the ocean floor, especially the continental shelf. It
also puts together the basic factors for a revival of territorial dis-
putes on the scale seen only with regard to land in the past. For
territorial waters claims, land claims are crucial, however small they
may be. Therefore, modern enclaves take on a peculiar significance.
If Norway could claim up to 200 miles off of its coast, it would
increase its size by five times. Countries with long coastlines are
the winners. Continental countries, or those with irregular coasts
are among the losers. This was illustrated by the North Sea oil
rights claimed by Netherlands and Denmark to the detriment of Germany.
Countries with the remains of former colonial empires also stand to
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gain if all of the aspects of the Law of the Seas convention were to
take effect. But this would be a major point of contention again
between the mother country, and enclaving country. In the case of
Spain and Morocco, the ocean boundaries around the Canaries create
tension in the area.
Groupings of enclaves with significant sea resources include nearly
all with the exception of Berlin. Each of the coastal enclaves, or
island enclaves, has potential for such expansion. It is interesting
that with this sea outlet, the rights of access problem, the major
problem associated with enclaves of the past, is almost eliminated,
but a new modern problem of resources arises. When an island enclave
is less than six miles off the coast, the traditional three-mile
territorial waters limit becomes a problem. If a 50-mile economic
zone is declared, the island enclave causes further territorial prob-
lems, and even rights of access problems start to reenter the picture.
Examples of economic zones and potential problems with regard to
fishing include: Canaries, Ceuta/Melilla, Channel Islands, Corsica,
Cyprus, Faeroes, and the Greek islands. Many of those same names come
up again for off-shore mineral rights. Significant examples include:
Tierra del Fuego, Falklands, and the Greek islands off Turkey. Most
of the minor island enclaves of the world have had little or no con-
flict because of their relative lack of value. Clearly, if oil were
discovered off St Pierre/Miguel on, north of Bornholm, east of the
Canaries, off the Channel Islands, or off little Kasterllorizon, south
of Turkey, the respective enclaving countries of Canada, Sweden, Morocco,




between the United Kingdom and Iceland, is a further example of the way
tensions between friends can develop over lines drawn from small pieces
of land.
D. ANOTHER SCHEME OF CLASSIFICATION
In mid-1982, Robert von Lucius wrote an article which appeared in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine called "Wo gibt es den nachsten 'Falkland-Konflikt'?"
("Where Will We Have the Next "Falkland's Conflict 1 ?"), [Ref. 114]. His
article deals with over 75 pieces of territory, most of which are small,
and many of which fit the traditional definition of enclave, if not the
broader one used here. Lucius says that the first category of these ter-
ritorial problems is where some borders are not really defined. For
example: Libya/Tunisia, Iran/Iraq, Soviet Union/China, India/China,
Guatemala/Belize, and Venezuela/Guyana.
His second category deals with problems over annexation of foreign
countries. Examples include parts of Germany that were formerly East
Prussia, Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania, the South Kuril Islands, Tibet, East
Jerusalem, and Afghanistan. Lucius' next category is islands. He
includes Paracel and Spratley Islands in the South China Sea (China,
Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines all want them), and the Abu Musa
and Tumb Kubra and Tumb Sughra in the Persian Gulf (Iran and United
Arab Emirates)
.
Lucius then says that the Falklands are different from these
other islands. They represent a category different from all the rest.
In this category, there are over 60 areas far from the motherland,
most of which are microstates in the Pacific or the Caribbean. Of
the mother countries, Britain, France, and the United States have 15
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each. Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Portugal, South Africa and the
Netherlands have less than 15 between thern.
For the most part, there are no problems Lucius says; but there
are ten areas where there are significant conflicts of interest. For
Britain, these are Hong Kong, Falklands, Gibraltar, and Diego Garcia.
The French have two, both off Madagascar: Mayotte and Comoran, and
lies Gloriens. The Portuguese have Macao. The U.S. has Guantanamo.
The South Africans have Walvis 3ay. Spain has Ceuta and Melilla.
(Guantanamo and Walvis Bay are enclaves which are the most similar to
Ceuta and Mel ilia.
)
Lucius then says six of these are not so important. The other four,
Walvis Bay, Guantanamo, Gibraltar, and Ceuta and Melilla are more
important because of their potential for military problems. Although
the analysis is somewhat different in its approach and its examples anu
individual cases are somewhat different from mine, both significantly
deal with enclave problems, and in each case, come up with Ceuta and
Melilla as enclaves among those with the greatest potential for problems,
E. COMMON INCOMPLETE COMPARISONS OF THE SPANISH ENCLAVES
There are many ways that all of these territorial and enclave
situations are similar, and there are many ways that each is different.
Only by a complete and systematic analysis of the similarities and the
differences can insight be gained by comparison of one enclave or terri-
torial dispute with another. There is always a tendency to think of
any one enclave situation as similar in one way or another with other
enclave situations with which one is familiar. This can be said of
any territorial disputes. Some of the incomplete comparisons that
153

have been made regarding the Spanish enclaves are discussed below.
They present problems in thinking clearly about the particular details,
because they consider only one aspect rather than tne many facets
which must be considered as presented in the analytical framework above.
Ceuta and Mel ilia have been described as similar to Hong Kong and
Macao because they all act as outlets for goods from the hinterland,
and are mutually beneficial situations, [Ref. 115]. The Spanish
enclaves and Gibraltar have been identified as similar because both
have displaced native populations. A learned writer on the Middle
East said he thought the Spanish enclaves were similar to the French
Departments in Algeria, because they are considered a part of metro-
politan Spain. I personally was struck by the appearance of the cities
of Ceuta and Mel ilia—typical Andalucian towns with bullrings, churches,
whitewashed buildings, and the like. Also the geographical mirror-
image of the two rock capes on opposite sides of the Strait of Gibraltar
draws one's attention to that similarity between Ceuta and Gibraltar.
Each of the above analogies is incomplete, drawing only on apparent
similarity between two reasonably analogous situations. The comparison
to Hong Kong and Macao overlooks the fact that the people of the
Spanish enclaves are mostly Spaniards (over 75,000), whereas the resi-
dents of Hong Kong and Macao are mostly Chinese. The ethnic population
in the case of Hong Kong and Macao is primarily that of the "enclaving"
country. The flow of goods is also into the hinterland from the Spanish
enclaves, whereas it is in the opposite direction in Hong Kong and ilacao,
Finally, a question of proximity exists. Whereas Hong Kong and ilacao
are half way around the world from 3ritain and Portugal, Ceuta is one
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hour by ferry, and within visual contact of mainland Spain, tfelilla
is only a 30 minute flight from Malaga and Almeria at less than 120
nautical miles away.
There are both similarities and differences between Gibraltar and
the Spanish enclaves of North Africa. Geographically, Ceuta and Gibraltar
are similar. The displaced native populations argument still is an incom-
plete analysis, and represents only one facet of the situation. Ceuta
has not been Arab for over five centuries. Neither has ilelilla been
Arab for 435 years. Furthermore, there has been no policy of expulsion.
The presence of Moroccan minorities in both Ceuta and Mel ilia attests
to this. There is, however, a policy of exclusion which limits the
number of non-Spaniards that can make their residence in Ceuta and ilelilla.
Although English is widely spoken in Gibraltar, the language of
business and of the home is Spanish. The language of business in tne
Spanish enclaves is not Arabic by contrast. Chinese is the primary
language in Hong Kong and i<1acao, and thus represents another difference
between them and the Spanish enclaves. The Spanish surnames of the
residents of Gibraltar are evidence of their constant linkage to Spain
even after a 13 year blockade, and 270 years of British possession.
Although there is Arab influence in the Spanish enclaves, the Spanish
influence is the overwhelming one.
Gibraltar and Ceuta are similar in their geo-strategic position.
But the enclaves and Gibraltar are different again because of Britain's
distance from Gibraltar of over 300 miles, and Spain's proximity Ceuta
of ten miles, with visual contact. Spaniards describe this situation
of Spain on two continents as similar to the way in which Turkey is on
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two continents separated by a narrow strait . The Greece/Turkey situation
has many more similarities: Geographic proximity, centuries of occupa-
tion and domination by one country of the other, and vice versa, and
friction in the form of Moslem culture versus Christian culture.
It is in the ethnic factor and the centuries of occupation variously
by one culture of the other that the analogy of Spanish enclaves to the
French Departments breaks down. Algerians did not occupy France for
seven centuries. Although the Moors did invade southern France in the
700's, they were swiftly pushed back. The conquest of Algeria was as
a part of the 19th century age of colonialism and imperialism, not as
a part of a reconquest comprising centuries of territorial warfare.
The proximity of France to Algeria is different again as it is 400
miles across the Mediterranean to Algeria, and not simply across a
narrow strait or the Alboran Basin. Size and ethnic makeup are anotner
difference. The Departments were large. The enclaves dre small.
Ethnically only one-tenth of the population of the departments was
European. Close to three-quarters of the population of the Spanish
enclaves are ethnic Spanish. Finally, another difference is that NATO
included the French Departments in the original treaty. The Algerian
revolution was considered a domestic affair. NATO has excluded the
Spanish enclaves, even though they were Spanish long before the Depart-
ments were French. The concept that the enclaves are not on the North
Atlantic, and therefore cannot be covered, is a specious argument.
Italy is not on the Atlantic, and has no common border with a Warsaw
Pact country, yet it is included for obvious other reasons. The
Canary Islands of Spain are covered as a part of NATO, yet they are
geographically an island archipelago of continental Africa. Their
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position in the North Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer makes the
rationalization easier, and their strategic location and importance to
Spain makes their inclusion unquestionable. Yet, the Spanish enclaves,
much to the chagrin of NATO's first new member since 1955, are excluded.
Ceuta and Mel ill a, although located in Africa, have a Spanish Anda-
lusian appearance. Many Moroccan towns have an Andalusian appearance,
even as far south as around Rabat, which was in the French Protectorate,
not the Spanish. The reason is because the native Moors settled there
and built various towns with their whitewashed structures after the
expulsion from their "native* Andaluci a. It is here that one starts to
see some subtle differences in the enclaves, and the territorial dis-
putes between Spain and Morocco. The 1400 years of being variously
"the conqueror" and "the conquered" are not erased with the U.N. decol-
onization declaration which actually was aimed more at the acquisitions
of the pre-World War I age of imperialism than at the conquests of five
centuries ago.
As with all reasonable analogies, there are similarities wnich if
taken far enough, ultimately break down. In fact, if comparisons and
analogies are used, and the questions "How are these situations similar?"
and "How are they different?" are not systematically answered, one can
draw wrong conclusions, or at least conclusions based on incomplete
data. Analogies can and should be used to discuss, analyze, and gain
insight into various enclave situations and territorial disputes.
The limitations and differences of each analogy must be understood and
presented to avoid confusion and disastrous misrepresentation. The
systematic framework for comparison is devised to facilitate such
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comparison, and to bring out the major similarities as well as the
major differences.
The enclave situations between Spain and Morocco are far more
similar in most respects to Walvis Bay in Namibia, Guantanamo in Cuba,
and the Greek/Turkish dispute. This is much more the case than any
analogy drawn to Gibraltar, Hong Kong, or Macao. Answers and insights
are therefore gained more by comparison to these situations than to
others. When analyzed in terms of superpower interest, geo-strategic
location, special circumstances and relations between the mother and
the enclaving countries, the potential for problems and the difficulty
of finding acceptable and easy solutions becomes much more apparent.
The geographical, ethnographic, historical, political, and military
aspects of the Spanish enclaves have striking similarity to those of
the Greek and Turkish dispute. To arbitrarily support one side or
the other in a debate such as this is to be insensitive to a myriad
of details which could negatively affect either country in the debate.
F. GENERAL ENCLAVE AND TERRITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The thousands of land enclaves of the past have almost disappeared,
and with them the active acceptance of conventional rights of passage.
For places like West Berlin, the movement of troops, supplies, equip-
ment, trade, people, communications, air transit, river transit, and
land access remains a one-of-a-kind situation. A tailored solution
must continuously be worked out for this problem that was commonplace
as recently as the past two centuries. The Berlin Agreement of 9
November 1972 has regulated many of these factors. Armies in the
past naturally traversed the territory of others to get to their
enclaves. Rights of passage agreements were worked out.
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The new enclave problem of today is not so much one of being land-
locked. It is one where International Law and Law of the Sea impact
on large and small remnants of past empires. These modern-day enclaves
can widen existing differences, and can serve as a springboard for
plunging countries into larger confrontations. These outlying areas
around the world have coastal and water access. They are indicative
of the modern problem of enclaves, created by the modern Law of the
Sea with associated problems of "territorial ization of the oceans" and
"creeping jurisdiction", [Ref. 116].
The problems associated with enclaves can escalate easily as a point
of continual animosity. They can intensify until significant conflict
exists. Historical background fills in some of the answers to why some-
thing of little apparent value stirs the emotions.
The Bertram and Hoist book, New Strategic Factors for tne North
Atlantic
,
includes a discussion of a Soviet strategy for neutralization
of the North Atlantic islands, including Jan Mayen, Iceland, Greenland,
the Faeroes, and Svalbard, each of which is discussed in this context
of outlying strategic territories, [Ref. 117]. Further south in the
Atlantic, the Soviets have shown more than passing interest in the
Cape Verde Islands, and as mentioned above, the Canaries. Any Soviet
chokepoint strategy could make good use of access to Ceuta or the
Melilla/Chafarinas Islands area as well.
The preceding discussion, supported by selections from 3ertram and
Hoist suggest that International Law and Law of the Sea must be con-
sidered in the operational planning, and the strategic thinking processes
D. P. O'Connell brings out in the Bertram and Hoist book that Law of the
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Sea, even though it is overtaken by the events of war, is significant
in the escalation process as a source of conflict, [Ref. 113],
Although the encircled enclaves of the past have all but disappeared,
the modern enclaves, i.e., islands and points of land closer to the
territory or territorial sea of a foreign country, will no doubt con-
tinue as a factor that could present both challenges to Western Alliance




A. THE FIVE SPANISH ENCLAVES
It is easy to see the similarities among the Spanish North African
enclaves. They are similar overall in terms of sovereignty and con-
tinental location. Ceuta and Me 1 i 11 a are similar because they have
large civilian populations and are major ports. The minor places are
all similar in that they are nothing more than military garrisons and
a burden for Spain to occupy. Spain continues to hold them as a matter
of principle. If Spain relinquishes one, the others could be expected
eventually to follow like dominoes.
Each of the five enclaves is different in its own way, either by
its location on the coast in relation to the Moroccan hinterland, its
location in relation to Spain, or by its date and circumstance of
acquisition. If one had to assess the relative value of each of the
five, Ceuta would have to be considered the prize. The Penon de Velez
is probably the least accessible by land, and therefore, the least
valuable because of its lack of hinterland resources and communication.
In principle, Velez could be grouped with the two major enclaves because
of its date of acquisition in 1507. Spain acquired the Chafarinas
Islands in the 1800's and, therefore, those islands are the only places
of sovereignty which date from the 19th century age of impearialism.
The Spanish presence in Chafarinas seems least justifiable if date of
acquisition is the only consideration. If any of the enclaves were
to be relinquished, this likely would be the first, since it was the
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last acquired. The Spaniards assert, however, that when they occupied
Chafarinas, the islands were deserted, uninhabited, and under no other
sovereignty. Their value to either Spain or Morocco is questionable.
However, the past reputation as an excellent natural anchorage for large
ships gives it some naval significance. It would be a good Western
Mediterranean anchorage, and consequently could be of value to the
Soviet Navy which uses anchorages more than port facilities in the
Mediterranean. It could be used to augment the Mel ilia anchorage,
and provide protection from winds and weather.
Alhucemas, with a date of acquisition in 1673, is the enclave
where conflict potential is the greatest, because of national pride.
Land communications to the surrounding Moroccan area are good. Air
communications to the Moroccan civil airfield near Al Hoceima are
good, Alhucemas Island's location, less than one mile off the Moroccan
shore opposite Morocco's largest Club Med, could hinder development of
tourism in the bay area. Alhucemas Island is not absolutely required,
however, for Morocco to develop the bay for tourism. At the yery most,
the small island is seen as a Moroccan embarrassment by foreign visitors
who view the Spanish fortress within the Moroccan bay. The hinterland
is a rich valley, and there is a small, but good quality, beach and
shoreline. The Alhucemas Bay (Ajdir Bay) area is one that the Moroccan
Government is trying to develop for tourism. Because of its ease of
access by Moroccans, both civilian and military, and its limited Spanish
defenses (less than 100 men), it is the most vulnerable of the enclaves.
On the other hand, foreign tourists frequent the area and incidents here
likely would cause more bad publicity than the Moroccan tourist trade
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would like to have. The monolithic Spanish fortress in the bay, main-
tained with little Spanish fanfare, is an accomodation which easily can
be accepted by Morocco as the Moroccan Government works on more pressing
problems. Alhucemas Island is of little value to Spain. However, if
it were relinquished to Morocco, both countries would likely view it as
the first domino to fall. Consequently, it could be pivotal in the
plans of either country, either in terms of Spanish defense or of
Moroccan irredentism.
Mel ilia is no longer a real prize for Spain. Spain does not tap the
resources of the iron mines to the south. Its significance is great for
the military of Spain, especially the Army which has had to plan and
execute its defense. Mel ilia was the first to rise against the Republican
democracy at the beginning of the Civil War. Franco's statue is displayed
proudly just outside the port facility. Because Spain's position in
Mel ilia is somewhat less tenable than in Ceuta, and because of the impor-
tance of Mel ilia to the Moroccans as a deep water port for hinterland
development, the existence of the Moroccan breakwater at Mel ilia is of
great importance. Morocco receives the deep water port it needs by use
of the south breakwater facility which it continues to expand. Morocco
can develop its resources freely to the south, with the realization that
deep draft ships can use Mel ilia. This compromise works in Spain's favor
because it reduces tensions with Morocco. The compromise gives Spain
time to solidify its internal political situation with regard to demo-
cracy and the Spanish military. The exact time that Morocco gained
access to the south breakwater is not known, but it was within three
years of the 1975 enclave incidents. The agreement on Moroccan use
could have come from talks conducted during that time.
163

Ceuta is the strategically-located prize for both Spain and Morocco.
A poor man's Gibraltar, it still is a significant port and fortress. It
is of great symbolic value to both countries. The Spanish enclaves
situation is much more similar to the Greek-Turkish situation than to the
Gibraltar situation as Morocco asserts, making it a much more complex
problem. For Spain, it symbolizes the first time that the Iberians
successfully took the war across the straits during the reconquest. Its
loss would be more grave to the Spanish psyche than any of the rest of
the enclaves. It would be the last domino to fall. For Morocco, a
return of Ceuta would be the final expulsion of European domination.
Practically-speaking, however, Ceuta is not critical to Morocco. Tangier
is a major port only 25 miles away. If the Moroccan Government were
serious about Riff development, Tangier, Al Hoceima, and Nador would
have been linked by regular ferry and air service. The conditions of
neglect in the Riff have often been blamed on the Spanish, when in fact,
the Riff has been neglected by Morocco because Rabat places a low
priority on the area, and on the staunchly independent Berbers that live
there.
If all the enclaves were to go to Morocco, unification would be
complete only until Moroccan irredentists decided that the Canaries
should become part of Africa, or until Moroccans decided to move east
and south to reunite all the traditional Kingdom of Morocco which
lies in Algeria and Mauritania. Spain apparently would prefer to have
Melilla and the minor enclaves as bargaining chips than have any
serious problems raised in Ceuta or the Canaries. Any compromises made
in Melilla, the special wage differential for some professions to work
and live there, and the tenacity with which Spain maintains troops on
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isolated, desolate pieces of nonproductive rock, all are evidence attest-
ing to this preference. Very few, if any, Spaniards would consider
giving up the Canary Islands.
B. SPANISH AND MOROCCAN STABILITY
Spain has made great strides both since the Civil War in 1939, and
in the post-Franco era since 1976. Its democracy is continuing to
develop and strengthen. During 1981 and 1982, significant Army displea-
sure over new systems continued to surface. Spain is a country trying
to reach the ten-year mark as a democracy, and to move beyond that first
difficult decade. The integration of Spain's military into NATO moves
slowly forward. The give-and-take of the integration process must pro-
ceed at a rate that encourages mutual participation by all three services:
Navy, Air Force, and Army. Spain should be given preferential treatment
by NATO if the alliance expects to utilize Spain to its greatest advan-
tage as a member of the NATO team. EEC membership would aid significantly
in Spain's rapid integration into mainstream Europe.
Spain works against the clock, however, as the new Socialist Govern-
ment shows its ability to help solve problems. Major setbacks could
again excite the politically-minded colonels. If Morocco were to press
the enclaves issue before the completion of Spain's first decade of
democracy, or before Spain's integration into NATO is complete, the
effects would be disastrous. Democratic development and NATO integration
are important both for Spain, and for its European allies. The true test
of Spanish stability could be in the early 1990* s when, as a power inte-
grated into the European mainstream, Spain could make lasting concessions
with its southern neighbor.
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Morocco is still a young country in the modern world. Moroccans
have moved from one irredentist issue to another during the short period
since independence in 1956. The country has advanced, but it has a long
way to go. King Hassan is a very capable leader who has used irredentist
claims to unite his people. A concentration on consolidation, development
and internal progress for the Moroccan people would aid greatly in
Moroccan stability. Unfortunately, a leader of Hassan's talent does not
appear to be present to take over. U.S. and European cooperation with
Morocco must expand to include more institutional relationships, not
just those at the head of state and military levels. If there is neglect
in this area, the United States and the West are courting disaster with
their support of a man instead of a country. The United States must
not let King Hassan down, but by the absence of expanded institutional
ties, the King and post-Hassan Morocco will most assuredly be undermined.
Spain-watchers are looking north, at Spain's democratic development,
the Socialists, the military, terrorism, NATO roles and missions, and
Spanish integration into mainstream Europe. Morocco-watchers are looking
south at the war in the Sahara, economic development around Casablanca
and Rabat, the expanding phosphate industry, and the strength of pro-
Western Arab leader King Hassan. One of the ironies of the enclaves
situation at the important strait is that developments there could catch
Spain-watchers and Morocco-watchers offguard while their attentions are
aimed in the opposite direction.
There is an additional irony whose consequences potentially are more
grave for the United States and NATO. The enclave situations on both
sides of the Strait of Gibraltar represent a no-win situation for the
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Allies. Whether it is Gibraltar or Ceuta, one of them will smite NATO.
If there is no change in the status of Gibraltar under the NATO frame-
work, it could halt the integration of Spain's military into NATO. The
long discussed NATO referendum could become a reality, as the Socialists
have suggested, and British intransigence over Gibraltar would receive
very bad press in Spain. Under the NATO framework, Spaniards expect
Gibraltar's status to change. The results of the referendum could be
disastrous for the alliance, and for Spain as it tries to depoliticize
the Army.
The other side of the no-win situation is that if Gibraltar is
returned to Spain, the Moroccans expect a change in the status of the
Spanish enclaves. Either way, regional stability is adversely affected
reducing the Western advantage and producing Soviet opportunities
because of the instability produced. The similarity of the Spanish-
Moroccan situation to the Greek-Turkish territorial situation is strik-
ing. None of the alternatives are acceptable to all parties, and the
situation therefore remains potentially explosive and destabilizing.
C. SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES
If North Africa is of importance to the Soviet Union, then Morocco
and the Strait of Gibraltar are as well. Although Morocco has declared
itself pro-Western, it has nonetheless kept the door open with the
Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union. The presence of
engineers and professors from nearly ewery eastern bloc country attests
to this openness. Morocco's interests now lie with the West, but the
Soviet realignment in the Horn of Africa and the special Peruvian
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relationship with the Communist bloc could serve as models for a
similar potential Moroccan situation.
In the late 1990*5, a stable Morocco could seriously negotiate on
the enclaves. In the 1980's, however, both Morocco and Spain have too
little to gain, and too much peripherally to lose if Morocco were to
press the enclaves issue. The sensitive nature of the situation during
the remainder of the decade of the 1 980 ' s presents unusual opportuni-
ties for Soviet exploitation, and unusual problems for Spain, Morocco,
and their common friend, the United States.
The United States and the West can do nothing less than have a
complete knowledge of the enclaves situation which involves these two
countries and their interaction. The exclusion of the enclaves from
the NATO treaty sends a signal to the Soviets of a target of opportunity,
A stirring of emotions on either side of the strait by Soviet propagan-
dists could occur over either Gibraltar or the Spanish enclaves. The
United States' desire to remain neutral would hurt relations with both
countries. In the event of conflict, U.S. arms would be employed to
a large extent. Contrast U.S. support to Britain over the Falklands,
south of the Tropic of Cancer, and clearly outside of NATO, to any
position other than pro-Spanish. Prior to Spain's NATO integration and
its first decade of democracy, the U.S. would have to side with Spain
over the issue of the Places of Sovereignty. To do anything else would
undercut Spain's democratic growth, European solidarity, and alliance
cohesion. The Soviets would then side with Morocco and polarize the




The United States and NATO should send strong signals of support
for Spain in NATO, and for its further integration with the European
democracies. A clear understanding of all aspects of the enclave
issues and analogous situations must be developed to avoid policies
which could adversely affect Spanish democracy or the Spanish assumption
of its NATO role. Spanish presence in all the enclaves sends clear
signals of resolve to the Moroccans, and contributes to stability.
Spain has compromised where it could in the interest of both countries.
No major movement should be made by Spain that would raise the expecta-
tions of Moroccan irredentists until possibly the 1990's. The Spanish
paranoia which is demonstrated by the maintenance of troops on the
rocks at Velez and Alhucemas may have subsided by that time. Spanish
democracy and NATO membership will be on firm ground, and by then a
better assessment of Moroccan growth and stability can be made.
Until that time, the enclaves, especially Melilla and the minor
places, will represent an anamoly, an irritant, and an anathema with
significant potential for European problems and Soviet opportunities
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WORLD ENCLAVES AND TERRITORIES SEPARATED FROM THE
TRADITIONAL MAINLAND OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY
1. Argentine Tierra del Fuego.
* 2. West Berlin.
3. Bomholm Island—closer to other countries (Sweden, Poland and
East Germany) than to mainland Denmark.
4. Canary Islands—geographically an African archipelato, ethnically
European.
5. Cayman Islands—closer to Cuba and Jamaica than to Britain.
* 6. Ceuta, Mel ill a, and the minor places.
7. Channel Islands—closer to France than Britain, more French influ-
ence than British in some cases; they are personal feudal fiefs
of the Queen.
8. Corsica—Ethno-geographic enclave; ethnically more similar to Italy
than France; geographically closer to Italy.
9. Cyprus—Ethno-geographic enclave; more Greek Cypriots than Turkish
Cypriots; closer to Turkey geographically.
10. Falkland Islands—closer proximity to Argentina than to Britain; on
same continental shelf extension as Argentine coastal area.
11. Faeroe Islands—closer to Britain than to Denmark.
*12. Gibraltar.
13. Goa—enclave of the past.





19. Memel , Danzig, Prussia—past enclaves.
20. Northern Ireland— Ethno-geographical-religious enclave.
*21
. St. Pierre, Miguelon—closer to Canada than to France, major com-
mercial ties with Canada.
*22. Taiwan's Quemoy and Matsu.
23. Turkey in Europe.
*24. Walvis Bay.
25. Zara—past enclave.
*Those in the list above annotated with an asterisk are bonefide enclaves
of today. Many of the others are either enclaves of the recent past,
territories which bear similarities to some enclave situations, or
ethno-geographical curiosities where one ethnic group lives as a
minority surrounded by hostile neighbors.
This list is by no means meant to be exhaustive or all inclusive. It is
rather for illustrative purposes. It leaves out such enclaves as
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